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1. According to WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 90 (1st ed. 1993),
ante means "a poker stake usually arbitrarily fixed and usually put up before the
deal to build the pot." If a poker metaphor is applied to marriage, each
prospective spouse anticipates that the other will invest 100% of his or her
available "ante" or resources into the marriage "pool" to further the financial and
emotional well being of the relationship. Ideally, couples play the marriage game
not in the spirit of competition, but in the spirit of cooperation. Married couples
may presume that any financial gain attributable to the marriage will be divided
fairly between the parties if the game ends in divorce. Thus, premarital
agreements are designed to skew the "ante" by allowing a party to limit or waive
his or her contribution to the marriage pool.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The intersection of family law and property law raises intriguing
questions related to identifying and protecting marital property
rights. For example, what characterizes an inalienable 2 family law
right? Many family law rights are deemed inalienable. 3 Despite the
wide array of inalienable rights in the area of family law, the future
right to a share of marital property4 is generally alienable so long as
2. See infra pp. 427-30 discussing the definition of inalienable.
3. See infra pp. 432-35 discussing family law rights generally deemed inalienable,
such as the right to seek a divorce.
4. This Article examines only the waiver of property rights arising out of marriage
in the event of divorce. It does not examine the implications and viability of the
premarital waiver of spousal survivorship rights in the event of death or the pre-
marital waiver of spousal support, alimony, and counsel fees in the event of di-
vorce because different legal considerations apply to the waiver of support and
spousal survivorship rights. Considerations of earning capacity, childcare duties,
need, and lifestyle should inform support determinations. Additionally, premari-
tal agreements dealing only with spousal survivorship rights were historically
less problematic to the courts because the parties entered into these agreements
in contemplation of the death of one of them while married and living together
and the adequacy of the provision to the surviving spouse under the agreement
was subject to judicial review at the time of enforcement. See, e.g., In re Gelb's
Estate, 228 A.2d 367, 371 (Pa. 1967) ("Whether claimant would have accepted the
$15,000 decedent gave her, if she had known the true value of his estate at the
time the antenuptial contract was executed, is not for us to conjecture. Suffice it
to say, she relied upon his statement of his assets. Furthermore, in our opinion,
$15,000 is not a proper settlement for a widow who has lived with her husband in
her own home for three years, when his estate at the time of marriage and death
20031
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procedural fairness requirements are satisfied.5 If marital property
rights were created by legislatures to achieve economic justice be-
tween divorcing parties, why is greater protection afforded to a tenant
entering into a lease by the creation of an implied and inalienable
warranty of habitability,6 than is afforded to an economically depen-
dant spouse entering into marriage? Given the policy goals of promot-
ing individual economic autonomy and reducing the number of adults
and children receiving public assistance, why is the economically de-
pendent spouse free to irrevocably waive the right to share in marital
property without regard to the economic or social consequences? Per-
haps the answer to this family law question depends upon whether
traditional precepts of contract law or property law control the analy-
sis. Contract precepts are founded upon the principle of individual
autonomy. In contrast, property law precepts are founded upon the
competing and antithetical principle that no individual's property
rights are absolute, but are subject to limitation according to the best
interests of the larger community. 7
Currently, premarital agreement property waivers are typically
analyzed using a traditional contract analysis. If a property rights
analysis is substituted for a contract right analysis, to decide the va-
lidity of premarital property right waivers, a radically different result
is attained. In short, waivers that might otherwise be valid as a mat-
ter of traditional contract precepts, are invalid according to property
law precepts. Therefore, a property right analysis enriches the debate
surrounding the validity of premarital property right waivers.
This article proposes that parties 9 should be unable to waive or
limit marital property rights10 before or during marriage. Instead, as
was in excess of $260,000. Therefore, the antenuptial agreement is voidable.. .
(quoting In re Gelb's Estate, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 203, 206 (Orphans' Ct. 1996)).
5. See infra pp. 416-27 discussing standards of validity and enforceability of pre-
marital agreements in the United States.
6. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(recognizing that every lease contains an implied warranty of habitability).
7. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (recognizing that no prop-
erty right is absolute).
8. See Kojo Yelpaala, Owning the Secret of Life: Biotechnology and Property Rights,
32 McGEORGE L. REV. 111, 162 (2000) (exploring the legal and philosophical roots
of the principle that no property right is absolute).
9. The argument that marital property should be treated as inalienable and pro-
tected from premarital waiver is based upon the economic position of the parties
and not upon gender. With respect to cohabitants, especially same-sex couples,
the ability to contract remains of vital importance since these couples acquire no
statutory rights if their relationship ends. Thus, contracts allow cohabitants to
create enforceable economic understandings absent default statutory protection.
10. See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw.
U.L. REV. 65, 133-34 (1998). Silbaugh argues that premarital agreements should
be invalid and unenforceable, not based upon the theory of inalienability, but
upon simple logic: to provide consistent treatment of rights relating to relation-
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a matter of property law and theory, these inchoate'1 marital property
rights should be treated as inalienable,12 until they can be expressly
identified, valued, and divided between the parties at the time of
divorce.13
This article is divided into five sections. Because the viability of
inalienable marital property depends upon the continuation of mar-
riage as a status, Part I of this article questions the continuing viabil-
ity of marriage as a means of financial, familial, and social order. Part
II of this article tracks the evolution of marital property in the United
States and proposes that an inalienability rule reinvests the relation-
ship of marriage with the economic consequences originally intended
by state legislatures. Part III of this article examines the metamor-
phosis of premarital agreements contemplating divorce from legally
void to valid, negating the potential value of marital property. Part IV
of the article proposes that marital property should be deemed ina-
lienable until divorce at which time such property can be identified,
valued and distributed based upon the circumstances existing at the
time of divorce. In conclusion, Part V of the article anticipates and
addresses potential arguments favoring the continued alienability of
marital property rights.
II. MARRIAGE: AN ENDANGERED STATUS?
Marriage, as an institution promoting individual and state values,
is under attack. The United States Congress recently passed legisla-
tion permitting states to define marriage narrowly.14 In contrast,
Vermont legislators recently passed a Civil Unions, Domestic Partner-
ships, and Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, 15 expanding the class of indi-
viduals entitled to spouse-like benefits. Fewer Americans marry and
ship that cannot be waived by spouses, such as the right to refuse to marry; the
right to obtain a unilateral divorce; and the statutory waiting period between the
initiation of the divorce action and the entry of a divorce decree.
11. Marital property does not even exist until one of the parties seeks a divorce, at
which time marital property springs into existence. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE &
DIVORCE ACT (1970) § 307 (amended 1973), 9A Part II U.L.A. 1 (1998). Thus,
marital property rights are inchoate unless and until a divorce action is filed.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 137-41 (defining inalienability to apply to in-
choate rights, such as the right to a share of marital property).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 111-16. This concerns the court's authority to
review agreements for fairness at the time of divorce. A fairness requirement
insures that any agreement reached by the parties is predicated upon the fair
market value of existing marital property, taking into consideration the facts and
circumstances that exist at the time of divorce.
14. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 (1997 & Supp. 2002), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. 2002)).
15. See Vermont Civil Unions, Domestic Partnerships, and Reciprocal Beneficiaries
Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §1204 (2000).
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those who do are postponing marriage. 16 Some same-sex couples de-
sire the right to marry.17 Divorce continues to stalk new marriages at
the rate of approximately 43%.18 Now, approximately 28% of children
in America are growing up in single parent households.19 The future
for marriage is uncertain. Proponents of covenant marriage20 argue
that the no-fault, easy-out legislation enacted in the last half of the
20th century throughout the country "threatens marriage itself."2 1
Given public concern regarding the uncertain future of marriage in
the United States, reform at the turn of the third millenium focuses on
discouraging divorce and strengthening marriage. 22 Implicit in this
goal is the assumption that marriage is a good and beneficial relation-
16. The proportion of adults over 35 who were married in 1970 was 87% and the
percentage declined to 65% in 2002. See http://www2.duq.edu/familyinstitute/
templates/features/csmfffamstatus.html (last visited on January 12, 2003). Addi-
tionally, the median age at first marriage rose from twenty-two in 1960 to
twenty-seven in 2000 for men and from twenty in 1960 to twenty-five in 2000 for
women. Eric Schmitt, For the First Time, Nuclear Families Drop Below 25% of
Households, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2001.
17. See John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 1119, 1128-36 (1999).
18. See U.S. Divorce Statistics, at http://www.divorcemag.com/statistics/statsUS.
shtml (last visited July 3, 2002).
19. The percentage of children living in a single parent home rose from 9% in 1960 to
28% in 1998. According to some sources, children who live in a "traditional nu-
clear family" are a minority. A web-cite supported by the Duquense University
reports that of children between the ages of fourteen and eighteen:
Presently 6% of American children live with a single, never-married par-
ent. 42% live in a traditional, nuclear family. 22% live in a second mar-
riage, two-parent family. 6% live with a cohabiting couple. 21% live
with a single parent. 3% live with a single, widowed parent. 40% or 25
million American children presently live without their father.
THE FAMILY INSTITUTE, DUQUENSE UNIVERSITY, The Current State of Marriage
and Family: Children (2003), available at http://www2.duq.edu/familyinstitute/
templates/features/csmf/index.html.
20. See Lynne Marie Kohm, A Comparative Survey of Covenant Marriage Proposals
in the United States, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 31, 39 (1999-2000). Covenant mar-
riage is a statutory framework that allows couples to elect more stringent
grounds to establish the right to divorce. Typically, the statute reintroduces the
requirements that only an innocent and injured party who can establish marital
fault is entitled to divorce. Arguably, the return to fault grounds undermines the
policy of minimizing the emotional harm to each party caused by divorce. The
logic of the legislation should be tested before it is adopted on a widespread basis.
It is entirely possible that the divorce rate of covenant marriages will be lower
because only those who would have remained married anyway opt in. It is also
possible that the divorce rate among the covenant marriage group will not differ
dramatically from the no-fault population; however, the process will be more acri-
monious and costly than the no-fault process.
21. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA.
L. REV. 1225, 1227 (1998).
22. See Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Reform at the Turn of the Millennium: Certainties
and Possibilities, 33 FAM. L.Q. 783, 786 (1999).
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ship.23 Although marriage is referred to as a contract, it is a contract
sui generis.2 4 It is of indefinite length. In every state, either party,
under a no-fault scheme, may unilaterally terminate the marriage
without incurring damages in the traditional sense of the word. Mar-
riage is a contract that requires physical, psychological, and emotional
performance on a constant basis until the parties separate as a result
of death or divorce. It requires two individuals to remain in a relation-
ship recognizing that the future is unpredictable and that circum-
stances are likely to change substantially throughout the entire
contract. 25 Family law scholars stress the tension between viewing
marriage as a contract and marriage as a status.2 6 The contract ap-
proach emphasizes individual satisfaction, while the status approach
accentuates the obligations that marriage creates to the other spouse,
to children of the marriage, and to the community.2 7
Despite the tension and uncertainty described above, individuals
continue to marry for a variety of different reasons. For example,
many believe that marriage creates a stable family structure to raise
children. 28 Moral and religious beliefs also inform the decision to
marry.29 For some, the emotional support and companionship offered
by marriage may prompt union.30 Thus, the institution of marriage
23. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) ("Marriage, as creating the
most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and civiliza-
tion of a people than any other institution, has always been subject to the control
of the legislature."); see also Wis. STAT. § 765.001 (2001) ("Marriage is the institu-
tion that is the foundation of the family and of society. Its stability is basic to
morality and civilization, and of vital interest to society and the state. The conse-
quences of the marriage contract are more significant to society than those of
other contracts, and the public interest must be taken into account always ....
The impairment or dissolution of the marriage relation generally results in injury
to the public wholly apart from the effect upon the parties immediately
concerned.")
24. See, e.g., Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U.S. 137, 147 (1874) ("Marriage is an institution
founded upon mutual consent. That consent is a contract, but a contract sui
generis. Its peculiarities are very marked. It supersedes all other contracts be-
tween the parties, and with certain exceptions, it is inconsistent with the power to
make any new ones." (second emphasis added)); Carabetta v. Carabetta, 438 A.2d
109, 111 (Conn. 1980) ("Although a marital relationship is in its origins contrac-
tual, depending as it does upon the consent of the parties, 'a contract of marriage
is sui generis. It is simply introductory to the creation of a status, and what that
status is the law determines.'" (citation omitted)); see also David B. Cruz, Just
Don't Call it Marriage: The First Amendment and Marriage as an Expressive Re-
source, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 965 n.218 (2001) (describing the marriage contract
as sui generis).
25. See CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAw
469-79 (2d ed. 2000).
26. See Silbaugh, supra note 10, at 111.
27. Id. at 114.
28. See MARILYN YALON, A HISTORY OF THE WIFE xi (2001).
29. Id. at 1-16.
30. Id. at xvii.
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survives as individuals marry, divorce, and remarry, pursuing what
some sociologists characterize as serial monogamy.3 1
In addition to improving the quality of life for spouses and chil-
dren, marriage also creates a financial relationship between the
spouses. As an incidence of marriage, parties owe to one another a
mutual duty of support throughout the marriage. The economic rights
of spouses are protected in the event of death or divorce by statutory
law designed to achieve economic justice.32
Finally, marriage promotes social order and other goals.3 3 The
state regulates marriage, records marriage, and conditions numerous
benefits upon the status of marriage. 34 Thus, the state actively en-
courages parties to marry. Certainly the benefit of raising children in
stable two-parent homes promises the state a better educated and per-
haps more emotionally stable population in future generations. 35 Fur-
thermore, to the extent that marriage allows two individuals to
experience life as meaningful and marriage as a lasting emotional and
economic commitment, society as a whole benefits. 3 6
Statistics demonstrate that one consequence of serial monogamy is
serial divorce. Divorce presents a host of problems to the individuals
and to the state. Single parents struggle to raise children sepa-
rately.37 Legal scholars continue to advocate divorce reform. Propos-
als range broadly from creating a security interest in the future
31. See generally Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of
Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 145, 159 (1998).
32. See, e.g., 23 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (2000).
33. Linda J. Waite, The Importance of Marriage is Being Overlooked, 127 USA TODAY
MAGAZINE, Jan. 1999, at 46 (asserting that marriage furthers the best interests of
individuals and the larger community).
34. See, e.g., Vermont Civil Unions, Domestic Partnerships and Reciprocal Benefi-
ciaries Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2000) (setting forth the rights afforded
to spouses under Vermont law); see also Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling
Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 496-98 (1992) (describing the
rights acquired by spouses following marriage).
35. See LAURENCE D. HOULGATE, FAMILY AND STATE 72 (1988) (proposing a two-track
system of conjugal partnership agreements in which it is far more difficult to
terminate a marriage with children, than a marriage without children).
36. See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER 188-92 (1999). Regan distinguishes
between the "external stance" toward the claims and obligations triggered by
marriage and the parallel but separate claims and obligations associated with the
"internal stance" toward marriage. Regan argues that property distribution
should focus on maintaining economic parity between the individuals following
divorce, rather than the current focus on the equity of the property division.
37. Although the divorce rate in the United States has declined since 1970, so has the
marriage rate. See Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the
Problematic Persistence of Traditional Marial Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1, 16 (2000).
Some scholars predict that two out of three marriages will end in divorce in the
twenty-first century. See Gary B. Melton, Children, Families, and the Courts in
the Twenty-first Century, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1993, 2011 n.87 (1993).
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earnings of the breadwinner spouse,38 to awarding back pay to the
homemaker spouse,3 9 to returning to a fault divorce scheme. 4 0 A pan-
oply of remedies have been suggested to redress the economic disad-
vantages that follow for the divorced and economically dependant
spouse, typically the primary caretaker of home and children, usually
the wife.41 Given the increasing likelihood that first marriages will
end in divorce, the economic rights afforded to married individuals,
especially the rights of the future primary caretaker of children, take
on added significance.
As it stands, primary caretakers of the home and children are dis-
advantaged when the statutory law enacted to protect them is imple-
mented at divorce. 4 2 In fact, society as a whole suffers the economic
repercussions of needy single parents. Despite the likelihood of di-
vorce and the inadequacy of statutory rights in place to protect divorc-
ing parties, many individuals waive the economic rights arising out of
marriage even before they wed. 43 Scholars agree that the statutory
marital property rights in place, prior to premarital waiver, are insuf-
ficient to achieve economic justice between divorcing spouses;4 4 never-
theless, many individuals substantially limit, or totally waive,
38. See June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Commu-
nity, 31 Hous. L. REV. 359, 372 (1994).
39. See Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Wo-
men's Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17, 20
(1998).
40. See Wardle, supra note 22, at 783 (predicting significant reform of unilateral no-
fault divorce based on the following five considerations: 1) the gaining momen-
tum of the grass roots reform movement; 2) the deeply held belief that divorce
harms families; 3) the fact that no-fault divorce has not substantially reduced the
acrimony between the parting parties; 4) the new reform movement is a flexible
movement that embraces a wide variety of reforms; and 5) the passage of the
covenant marriage laws in Louisiana and Arizona allowing parties to opt into a
fault divorce regime reflect a willingness of legislators to reform the no-fault di-
vorce approach).
41. See Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is there a Future for
Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509, 517 n.12 (1998) (citing Richard R.
Peterson, A Re-evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 Am. Soc.
REV. 528, 532 (1996) (finding that women's standard of living fell by 27% and
men's standard of living rose by 10% after divorce).
42. See Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women's Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A Mask for
Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1155 n.14 (citing James B.
McLindon, Separate but Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women
and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351 (1987)).
43. Premarital agreements are becoming more and more common. Approximately
50,000 are signed annually and approximately 20% of marriages in which at least
one party is marrying for the second time are preceded by the execution of a pre-
marital agreement. See Allison A. Marston, Note, Planning for Love: The Politics
of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 891 n.22 (1997) (citing Gary Bel-
sky, Living by the Rules, MONEY, May 1996, at 102).
44. See Bryan, supra note 42, at 1155 n.14.
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inchoate future property rights arising out of marriage by signing pre-
marital agreements.
Instead of proposing remedies to be applied by the courts at the
time of separation and divorce, this article focuses on the days and
weeks before the marriage and questions the validity of the premari-
tal waiver of future marital property rights pursuant to a private
agreement between the parties. 45 Despite the inadequacy of existing
marital property law, most jurisdictions have embraced the contract
approach to the validity of a premarital waiver of inchoate rights aris-
ing out of marriage. 4 6 Perhaps this is another indirect result of the
"equality revolution."47 Sameness in treatment, however, can further
entrench existing inequalities.48 Expanding the analytical focus to in-
clude property precepts and acknowledging the tension between prop-
erty rights of the individual and property rights of the community,
refocuses the premarital agreement debate by staking the individual's
interest in contracting freely against the community's interest in
achieving a wide variety of public policy goals upon divorce. 49 A prop-
erty rights analysis can, perhaps, restore the economic consequences
to the decision to marry, thus ensuring that only the financially com-
mitted marry and none are insulated from the economic consequences
of marriage. Requiring parties to make contractual decisions regard-
ing marital property contemporaneously with the divorce, should the
marriage end in divorce, when marital property rights mature, fur-
45. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns About the Uni-
form Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127, 134 n.33 (1993) (citing Fechtel
v. Fechtel, 556 So. 2d 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); see also Frances Olsen, The
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1497, 1537-38 (1983). Olsen observes that "contracts among lovers and friends
may reflect and perpetuate the inequalities in their relationships." Id. In fact,
lawyers typically recommend premarital agreements only to limit the property
distribution, support, and alimony exposure of a client, not to expand these
obligations.
46. See Silbaugh, supra note 10, at 120.
47. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY 32 (1991) (arguing
that divorce reform has failed to achieve gender equality). The ease with which
such rights may be waived by the economically dependant spouse, usually the
woman, is perplexing, given the struggle to obtain gender equality in matters of
property ownership and management in the United States. Fineman concludes
that rule equality at the time of divorce disadvantages "women who must func-
tion in an unequal world, which requires that they meet greater demands with
fewer resources." Id. at 176. Fineman notes that these egalitarian rules do not
even serve well the middle and upper classes, much less the poor, non-traditional
or otherwise "deviant" families. Id. at 30-31.
48. Id. at 32.
49. See PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMENDATIONS § 7.02
cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000) (discussing the special circumstances sur-
rounding family dissolution that require limits to the enforceability of contracts
addressing family dissolution).
468 [Vol. 82:460
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thers the explicit and implicit policy goals of divorce reform
legislation.
III. MARITAL PROPERTY: LEGISLATIVE RECOGNITION OF
THE CAPITAL OF MARRIAGE
The evolution of property rights afforded to married women upon
divorce in the United States reflects at least two public policy goals:
(1) to insure economic autonomy and fairness upon divorce and (2) to
minimize the indigent former spouse's reliance upon the state for sup-
port.50 The rights afforded to women in the United States to own and
manage property have slowly expanded over the past one hundred
years. Prior to the 20th century, society and the laws that sustained it
treated married women like children, operating under a gender disa-
bility that never abated.5 1 Thus, married women were deemed inca-
pable of managing their own income and real property.5 2 While boys
were more likely to be educated and were groomed to enter the public
sphere of paid labor, girls 53 were trained to enter the private sphere of
unpaid household management, in which the wife owed to the hus-
band a duty of domestic labor in return for the husband's support.5 4
Men held and controlled property individually and on behalf of their
wives and children. Men controlled the income from such property.
Men even controlled the outside income their wives managed to earn.
In short, men controlled wealth. 55
In response to this injustice and even though women lacked the
right to vote, the women's movement in the 19th century pressed for
property reform that recognized a married woman's right to control
her share of joint property. In 1860, New York passed a law granting
to a married woman the right to control her own wages.5 6 Thereafter,
50. The argument that marital property should be treated as inalienable and pro-
tected from premarital waiver is based upon the economic position of the parties
and not upon gender. See supra note 9.
51. See generally Reva B. Siegal, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims
Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994).
52. See VIRGINIA WOOLF, A RooM OF ONE'S OWN (1929). Woolf considers the fate of
Shakespeare's sister, imagined by Woolf to be as brilliant as her writer brother,
yet destined to a life of wifely drudgery, never being offered an opportunity to test
her creative genius because she lacked financial independence and indeed had no
hope to achieve it.
53. Girls continue to struggle for equality. See MARY PIPER, REVIVING OPEHLIA - SAV-
ING THE SELVES OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS 44 (1994). Piper writes: "Girls have long
been trained to be feminine at considerable cost to their humanity. They have
long been evaluated on the basis of appearance and caught in myriad double
binds: achieve, but not too much; be polite, but be yourself; be feminine and adult;
be aware of our cultural heritage, but don't comment on the sexism." Id.
54. See Siegal, supra note 51, at 1092.
55. Id.
56. See Siegal, supra note 51, at 1083-84.
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property reform legislation, which expanded married women's prop-
erty rights, spread throughout the country as each state adopted a
form of the Married Women's Property Act,57 thereby granting the
status of property owner to married women in the context of the com-
mon law title regime.58 Even after the enfranchisement of women in
1920,59 little changed to improve the economic condition of married
women. Property continued to be divided by title. Men, the economi-
cally independent partners to the marriage, continued to control their
income, the acquisition of assets, and the title to the assets.
The need for property reform grew, as the state's interest in mar-
riage spilled over into divorce. It was not until the 1960's, however,
that economic inequity following divorce spurred divorce property law
reform in the United States. In response to the economic injustice cre-
ated by distributing property according to title at the time of divorce, a
second wave of property reform6O swept the country in the 1960's in-
troducing no-fault divorce. No-fault divorce granted to married indi-
viduals the right to divorce without evidence of marital fault.6 1 This
legislation rejected the title regime and created marital capital6 2 in
57. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAw OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE United
STATES 290 n.4 (1988) (setting forth a comprehensive, if not exhaustive, list of the
statutory citations to these laws in the fifty states.)
58. See JOSEPH R. LONG, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 126 (3d
ed. 1903). Long writes, "In most, if not all of the states, statutes secure to a mar-
ried woman some or all of the property belonging to her at the time of the mar-
riage or thereafter acquired." Id. at 205.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
60. See Wardle, supra note 22, at 796 (discussing why no-fault divorce reform failed
women).
61. See JUDITH AREEN, FAMILY LAw 350-71 (4th ed. 1999) (Common fault grounds
typically include cruelty, adultery, and desertion.).
62. See HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 7-8, 226 (2000). De Soto de-
scribes capital as an idea that is recognized through a legal system that defines
and protects property interests and allows owners to leverage their property in-
terests. De Soto argues that the inability of the poor in Central and South Ameri-
can countries to access capital entrenches the divide between the rich and the
poor, creating a "bell jar" around the already wealthy elite who transform capital
into additional property regularly. Id. at 66-67. According to De Soto, one way to
foster capitalism is to centralize and simplify the bureaucratic procedures needed
to establish property ownership, to begin legal businesses, and to continue legal
businesses as Western countries have done. Id. at 62. De Soto might agree that
the creation of marital property is yet another example of the West's willingness
to create and leverage capital. The value of the tangible and intangible contribu-
tions of each spouse to a marriage becomes relevant to courts only in the event of
divorce when such contributions are valued and divided between the parties to
achieve a fair result. Thus, both spouses are assured an equitable share of the
marital capital in the form of marital property. De Soto calls for governments to
lift the "bell jar of property apartheid," by assigning value to intangible assets.
Id. at 67. Arguably, premarital agreements "introduce 'capitalist apartheid' into
the institution of marriage creating another 'bell jar' that should also be lifted."
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the form of marital property, typically defined to include all property
acquired by either party during the marriage without regard to title.
Following California's lead, states across the nation passed no-
fault divorce reform to achieve economic justice between divorcing
parties. 63 Arguably, divorce reform reflected a legislative attempt to
protect personal liberty by providing economic autonomy to both par-
ties, thus reducing the probability that one party to a divorce might
become dependent upon state aid.
For example, the policy underlying the Pennsylvania 1980 Divorce
Code, as set forth in the statute, expressly states that the new law is
designed to "achieve economic justice" between divorcing spouses. 64
The Pennsylvania statute defines the property rights acquired by
married parties, in the event of separation or divorce, to include: the
right to an equitable share of all marital property;6 5 the right to
spousal support and continued health insurance coverage during cov-
erture; the right to alimony following divorce; and the right to counsel
fees, costs, and expenses.SS
The creation of marital property arguably served two ends. Re-
formers sought to protect personal liberty through economic security
and to prevent the economically dependent spouse, and any children
in the custody of that spouse, from becoming dependent on state and
federal aid.67 Thus, the divorce reform legislation both maximized
personal liberty through financial independence and minimized the
public's financial obligation to support divorced spouses and children.
A majority of the states enacting reform went even further and re-
quired not equal, but equitable distribution to correct economic ineq-
uity at the time of divorce.6S Clearly, the legislation rejected the title
63. See AREEN, supra note 61, at 371-79.
64. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101-3500 (West 2000).
65. Id. For example, §307A of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, authorizes a
court to equitably apportion "the property and assets belonging to either or to
both [spouses] however and whenever acquired." Alternative section 307B man-
dates a court to "assign each spouse's separate property to that spouse" and to
divide community property "in just proportion."
66. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT (1970) §307 (amended 1973), 9A Part II
U.L.A. 1 (1998). Under the section 307 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,
an equitable share is to be determined by the court based upon a wide variety of
factual considerations designed to enable the court to achieve economic justice.
The factors include the court's assessment of the ability of the party to acquire
assets in the future and to become self-supporting.
67. See June R. Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideol-
ogy, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 985 (1991) (not-
ing the "disastrous consequences" of no-fault divorce for mothers with young
children and advocating a child-centered approach to all issues arising out of the
dissolution).
68. See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60-65 (1971). The unequal division of
marital property finds theoretical support in the writing of John Rawls: "All so-
cial values - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases for self-
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regime and created for each party a cognizable property interest in the
assets acquired during the marriage by either party without regard to
title.69
To the extent that a legally protected right promotes the individ-
ual's economic autonomy, it arguably constitutes "new property."70
Marital property is a unique property interest created by state legisla-
tures and designed to achieve economic justice. Marital property
rights ripen at the time of separation or divorce. The intangible status
of marriage creates tangible marital property rights arising from the
economic and non-economic contributions of both parties. The crea-
tion of marital property reflects the property precept that no property
right is absolute and all marital property is held subject to the best
interests of the community, including both the married community
and the public.7 1
In summary, marital property reform in the second half of the 20th
century exemplified a legislative recognition of the relationship be-
tween economic security and personal liberty.72 Marital property is a
state-created property interest designed to fairly redistribute property
acquired during the marriage between divorcing spouses. Marital
property embodies the principle that no property right is absolute, but
is always subject to limitation in furtherance of the best interests of
the greater community. The right to share in all property acquired
during the marriage, without regard to title, is inextricably connected
to principles of fairness, promotes individual autonomy, and reduces
the risk that divorce will create single parent households dependent
upon state aid. If we accept that marital property was created by leg-
islatures to redress economic inequality at the time of divorce, then
the right itself is wrapped in an immutable cloak of public policy that
cannot be pierced merely by invoking the private right to contract.
Any attempt to contractually waive a future interest in marital prop-
erty should, instead, be analyzed using property precepts reinforced
respect - are to be distributed equally, unless an unequal distribution of any, or
all, of these values is to everyone's advantage." Id. at 62.
69. While historically, the propertied person was typically the male, such assump-
tions are no longer supported. In fact, affording inalienability status to marital
property advances the policy interests of economic fairness and individual liberty
without regard to gender.
70. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Reich en-
couraged society to "build an economic basis for liberty" that would allow the indi-
vidual and society to "change, to grow, and to regenerate" by creating new
concepts of property. Id. at 787. It follows that the no-fault divorce reform legis-
lation can be considered as one form of the new property envisioned by Reich.
71. See Mary A. Throne, Pension Awards in Divorce and Bankruptcy, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 194, 195-96 (1988) (discussing policy goals of equitable distribution reform).
72. See Reich, supra note 70, at 771. Reich describes the role of private property as
one of"maintaining independence, dignity, and pluralism in society" and one that
"affords day-to-day protection in the ordinary affairs of life." Id.
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by the policy goals of fairness and economic autonomy underlying
marital property. 73
IV. MARITAL PROPERTY: PREY TO PRIVATE RIGHT TO
CONTRACT PRECEPTS
Prompted, perhaps by the expanded definition of property subject
to division upon divorce and the rising tide of failed marriages, many
affianced individuals began to require signed premarital agreements
releasing or limiting the intended's future marital property rights as a
pre-condition of marriage, 7 4 thus frustrating the legislative intent of
the no-fault divorce reform legislation. 75
The hard fought battle to create marital property rights was dealt
a staggering blow by the wave of judicial cases, following the enact-
ment of divorce reform, enforcing limitations and waivers of inchoate
future marital property rights.76 Although courts across the country
73. See generally Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromises and
Demoralization Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL
L. REV. 45 (1981).
74. See Sanford N. Katz, Marriage as Partnership, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251,
1258-59 (1998). Formerly, estate attorneys might have recommended premarital
agreements only to clients with children from a previous marriage who desired to
remarry. Now that individuals are postponing marriage, many have established
retirement funds and other investments earned prior to marriage that they de-
sire to shield from spousal claim. Some may be unaware that, in most jurisdic-
tions, these assets remain separate property so long as they are not transferred
into joint name or otherwise transmuted.
75. Contrary to the goal of achieving economic equality between divorcing spouses,
premarital agreements are more likely to benefit men than women. See Atwood,
supra note 45, at 154 (concluding that "[blecause of women's inferior earning ca-
pacity in the market place, the persistence of gendered division of labor in the
home, and the consequent disparity in economic bargaining power between men
and women, the strict enforcement of prenuptial agreements is more likely to
disadvantage wives than husbands").
76. A survey of the relevant cases in Massachusetts and Florida demonstrates the
relative scarcity of litigation surrounding premarital agreements related to di-
vorce prior to divorce reform and the surge in such litigation following divorce
reform, especially in jurisdictions in which premarital agreements were enforced
without regard to fairness at the time of enforcement. In Massachusetts, a "sec-
ond look" state, divorce reform was enacted in 1974. Between 1946 and 1974, a
total of 28 years, only 3 divorce cases also raised issues related to the validity of a
premarital agreement. Between 1974 through 2002, a total of 28 years, 10 re-
ported divorce cases also addressed the validity of a premarital agreement in re-
lationship to divorce. In contrast, consider Florida's statistics: Florida courts
determine the validity of premarital agreements according to traditional contract
precepts. Florida adopted divorce reform legislation in 1971. Between 1940 and
1971, a total of 31 years, only 11 divorce cases also raised issues related to the
validity of a premarital agreement in relationship to divorce. Between 1971
through 2002, a total of 31 years, 82 reported divorce cases also addressed the
validity of a premarital agreement under Florida law. The astonishing increase
in the number of premarital agreements litigated in divorce actions in Florida, a
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embraced the private right to contract as the basis for enforcing pre-
marital agreements so long as minimum procedural fairness require-
ments were satisfied, none of the courts addressed the question of
whether marital property rights were immutable and thus inalienable
until mature. 77 Arguably, marital property should be afforded the
greatest amount of protection available under law based upon soci-
ety's interest in promoting marriage, promoting economic fairness be-
tween the parties upon divorce, promoting individual economic
autonomy, and preventing former spouses from becoming dependent
upon the state. 78
Despite the safety net afforded by marital property to protect the
economically dependent spouse from financial disaster upon divorce,
some partners choose to marry without incurring the financial obliga-
tions that would otherwise attach. Following the no-fault divorce re-
form movement, more individuals executed premarital agreements
contemplating divorce. With little apparent debate, courts applied
traditional contract principles, to the exclusion of property principles,
to determine the validity and enforceability of premarital agreements.
Courts embraced a freedom to contract model, rejected the former
black letter law that all premarital agreements dealing with rights in
the event of divorce were invalid, and overlooked the argument that in
fact marital property rights should be inalienable until mature. Pre-
marital property waivers were enforced as a matter of course without
even considering the property precepts supporting the initial divorce
reform legislation: no property right is absolute and all marital prop-
contract oriented state, demonstrates the willingness of individuals to eschew
fairness by substituting a private agreement in place of the legislated default rule
which otherwise would create marital property to be identified, valued and di-
vided at the time the parties divorce.
77. In fact, scholars reasoned that only spousal rights with respect to property owned
prior to marriage could be shielded from the default rules. See Ian Ayres & Rob-
ert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 n.10 (1989) ("In the law of divorce, for example, wealth
accrued before marriage is allocated according to default rules that can be altered
in pre-nuptial agreements, while income earned after marriage is immutably di-
vided."). In fact, in many states, rights related to both income earned and prop-
erty acquired during the marriage can be protected from spousal claim through a
premarital agreement and are, thus, mutable.
78. See Reich, supra note 70, at 773. Reich warned against the abuse of the private
property defense when it is used as a "cloak" to disguise "the exercise of arbitrary
private power over other human beings .... 'The only dependable foundation of
personal liberty is the economic security of private property'." See Reich, supra
note 70, at 773 (quoting WALTER LIPpMANN, THE METHOD OF FREEDOM 101
(1934)). Thus, premarital agreements arguably undermine the public good by re-
turning the burden of support to the state, even though the default rule requires
the burden to born first by the spouse. Thus, principles of private property own-
ership are elevated above the principles grounding divorce reform. See also
Throne, supra note 71, at 195.
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erty is held subject to the best interests of the community, including
both the married community and the public.
Part III of this Article, examining the rise of traditional contract
precepts to decide the enforceability of premarital agreements, is fur-
ther sub-divided into three parts. First, section A examines the rise of
premarital agreements as an antidote to marital property rights. Sec-
ond, section B presents a comprehensive overview of the different
standards employed by American courts to decide the validity and en-
forceability of premarital agreements. Finally, section C examines the
inequity created by enforcing premarital agreements according to
traditional contract precepts.
A. Although Historically Invalid, Premarital Agreements
Contemplating Divorce Are Now Valid
Despite the sui generis nature of marriage as a contract and the
unique roots of marital property, a legislatively created property right,
courts have enforced marital property right waivers according to
traditional contract precepts. Under a traditional contract approach,
courts embraced and applied procedural fairness requirements to
guard against fraud, duress, and undue influence at the time of execu-
tion. This approach protects the present economic liberty interests of
both parties 79 at the expense of the future economic liberty interest of
the financially dependent party, the party who can least afford it.80
A comparison of the differing standards employed by the courts to
decide the validity of premarital agreements under Massachusetts
law, Florida law, and Pennsylvania law reveals the breadth of re-
sponses by courts initially called upon to decide the enforceability of
marital property right waivers in premarital agreements. An exami-
nation of Massachusetts law regarding the validity and enforceability
of premarital agreements illustrates the metamorphosis of premarital
agreements from void to valid. In Osborne v. Osborne,8 the court ad-
dressed the question of first impression: was a premarital agreement
divesting a spouse of the right to claim a share of property that would
otherwise be marital property valid under Massachusetts law. Previ-
ously, Massachusetts courts had held in dicta that "a contract tending
79. The decision to treat inchoate property rights as inalienable until mature ele-
vates the individual's right to personhood above the individual's right to contrac-
tual autonomy. See Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of
Surrogate Mothers, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1936, 1944 (1986); see also, Anthony T.
Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 779-86
(1983).
80. See Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate
Mothers, supra note 79, at 1945.
81. 428 N.E.2d 810 (Mass. 1981).
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to divest a husband of any obligation incidental to his marriage"8 2
would be invalid.
In rejecting this assertion, the Osborne court characterized pre-
marital agreements as a vehicle to settle property rights and, in keep-
ing with the no-fault divorce scheme, held that parties could, prior to
marriage, settle their property rights in the event that their marriage
should end in divorce. The decision to recognize premarital contracts
as valid was tempered by the added requirements that: (1) the agree-
ment must be fair and reasonable at the time of enforcement, (2) the
agreement will be subject to judicial modification at the time of en-
forcement, and (3) if the agreement is "so unreasonable as to be unen-
forceable on grounds of public policy,"83 it will be held invalid.8 4
The Osborne8 5 court relied in part upon the benchmark case of Pos-
ner v. Posner,8 6 Florida's leading premarital agreement case. In Pos-
ner, the Florida Supreme Court held that "[premarital] agreements
settling alimony and property rights of the parties upon divorce ...
should no longer be held to be void ab initio as 'contrary to public pol-
icy."' 8 7 The Posner court held that such agreements are enforceable if
they meet the same standards of fairness imposed by preexisting com-
mon law controlling premarital agreements contemplating the death
of the spouse.SS Even the Posner court, however, expressly preserved
the trial court's right to adjust alimony provisions based upon the
changed circumstances of the parties at the time of the divorce and
after the divorce.8 9 Intriguingly, Florida courts held inalienable the
right to spousal support during coverture. 90 Thirty years later, the
Belcher91 court's preservation of the right to spousal support during
coverture survives in Florida and raises important questions regard-
ing the premarital waiver of, not just support during coverture, but
82. Id. at 815; see also LONG, supra note 58, at 218 n.78 (citing Coles v. Hurt, 75 Va.
380 (1881), for the proposition: "Whenever a peculiar status is assigned by law to
the members of any particular class persons .. . no one belonging to such a class
can vary, by any contract, the rights and liabilities incident to this status. If he
could, his private agreements would outweigh the law of the land. Coverture is
such a status.").
83. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d at 816.
84. The court's willingness to independently review the substantive fairness of a pre-
marital agreement represents the minority position. See infra Appendix A, ta-
bles IV and V demonstrating that only nine states permit the court to review the
conscionability of agreements and only nine states permit the court to review the
substantive fairness of a marital property waiver under a premarital agreement.
85. 428 N.E.2d 810.
86. 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
87. Id. at 385.
88. Id. This standard required either an adequate provision determined by the cir-
cumstances existing at the time of execution or a full and fair financial disclosure.
89. Id. at 387.
90. See Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1972).
91. Id. at 9.
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also the waiver of future property rights arising out of marriage. 9 2 Ar-
guably, all future economic rights arising out of marriage should be
inalienable until the time of separation or divorce because the state
legislatures have mandated that these rights be determined on a case-
by-case, fact-driven basis.9 3 Some scholars argue that the right to
contractually resolve economic issues related to divorce should be dis-
allowed entirely, even at the time of separation or divorce. 94
The shift from the property right approach to a contract analysis to
determine the validity and enforceability of premarital agreements
previously deemed void as against public policy 95 swept the country.9 6
For example, in 1990, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overruled its
prior common law standard and held that courts must use traditional
contract law to decide the validity and enforceability of premarital
agreements. 9 7 This was in sharp contrast to the minority position al-
lowing judicial review of the substantive fairness of property waivers
in premarital agreements at the time enforcement is sought, a stan-
dard embodied by the Osborne case. In Simeone, the court addressed
the validity of a premarital agreement entered into in 1975, before the
enactment of the Pennsylvania 1980 Divorce Code, as amended. Al-
though the court retained the "full and fair disclosure" analysis, it
92. Florida's preservation of the right to spousal support during coverture is unusual.
For a survey of the validity of premarital agreements contemplating divorce in
the United States, see Robert Roy, Annotation, Enforceability of Premarital
Agreements Governing Support or Property Rights upon Divorce or Separation as
Affected by Circumstances Surrounding Execution: Modern Status, 53 A.L.R.4th
85 (1987); Robert Roy, Annotation, Enforceability of Premarital Agreements Gov-
erning Support or Property Rights upon Divorce or Separation as Affected by Fair-
ness or Adequacy of Those Terms: Modern Status, 53 A.L.R.4th 161 (1987).
93. Given the broad discretion afforded to the trial court to identify, marshal, value
and equitably divide marital property, based on the specific circumstances ex-
isting at the time of divorce, the court is called upon to do justice between the
parties based upon the surrounding circumstances. Thus, the premarital waiver
of marital rights creates a paradox by allowing parties to waive future rights that
do not yet exist without any of the information deemed vital by the legislature to
obtain a fair and impartial division of marital property.
94. See Bryan, supra note 42, at 1156, 1170. Bryan argues: "many women and chil-
dren needlessly live impoverished lives after divorce" and that judges should re-
tain continuing jurisdiction to review the substantive fairness of property
settlement agreements without regard to the passage of time. Id. at 1170.
95. See LONG, supra note 58, § 101. "At common law, the husband and wife become,
by marriage, one person; that is, the legal existence of the wife is suspended dur-
ing the marriage, or merged into that of the husband, under whose wing or cover
she is, whence is called a 'femme covert,' and her condition during marriage is
called 'coverture'." Id. at 167.
96. In no case did a court invalidate a premarital agreement on the basis that the
inchoate marital property rights released under the agreement are inherently
inalienable until mature.
97. Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990) (overruling the prior standard re-
quiring full and fair disclosure or judicial review to determine that the provision
in the agreement was adequate at the time of execution).
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abolished any judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of the
agreement:
There is no longer validity in the implicit presumption that supplied the basis
for tour] ... earlier decisions. Such decisions rested upon a belief that spouses
are of unequal status and that women are not knowledgeable enough to un-
derstand the nature of contracts that they enter. Society has advanced, how-
ever, to the point where women are no longer regarded as the "weaker" party
in marriage, or in society generally. Indeed, the stereotype that women serve
as homemakers while men work as breadwinners is no longer viable .... Nor
is there viability in the presumption that women are uninformed, uneducated,
and readily subjected to unfair advantage in marital agreements. 98
Thus, under Pennsylvania law, premarital agreements are valid in
the event of divorce, without regard to fairness, so long as the circum-
stances surrounding execution satisfied traditional contract principles
and the agreement was executed with the benefit of full and fair finan-
cial disclosure.
The Simeone court expressly refused to require parties entering
into a premarital agreement to obtain independent legal counsel.99
The Simeone decision clearly represented the new trend in premarital
agreement law whereby couples may replace the default statutory di-
vorce rules with an individualized contract.' 0 0 Under Pennsylvania
law, courts consider premarital agreements to be presumptively valid
and binding on the parties according to traditional contract precepts.
Premarital agreement law evolved independently from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. Massachusetts, at one end of the continuum, repre-
sents one of the most activist jurisdictions because courts will analyze
the substantive fairness of the agreement at the time enforcement is
sought. Pennsylvania, at the other end of the spectrum, is a model of
judicial restraint because courts will not pass on the substantive fair-
ness of the agreement, either at the time of execution or at the time of
enforcement so long as there is sufficient evidence of adequate disclo-
sure. Florida, in the middle of the spectrum, exemplifies a moderate
approach because courts will analyze the substantive fairness of the
agreement at the time of execution to determine its enforceability ab-
sent evidence of full financial disclosure or an adequate provision.
98. Id. at 165.
99. Id. at 166. The utility of independent counsel to insure fair dealing is limited
because of the difference in bargaining power between the parties. See Atwood,
supra note 45, at 130 n.15 (citing Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Legal Schooling, 77
IOWA L. REV. 19, 23-24 (1991).
100. See Note, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rejects Substantive Review of Prenuptial
Agreements, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (1990).
[Vol. 82:460
MARITAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
B. The Majority of Jurisdictions Enforce Premarital
Agreements Contemplating Divorce as a Matter of
Freedom of Contract Without Regard to
Property Law and Society's Interests
The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act [hereinafter U.P.A.A.],
like the Pennsylvania standard, adopts a heightened contract ap-
proach to decide the validity of marital property rights. The U.P.A.A.
requires a party to prove that an agreement is unconscionable and
was entered into without full financial disclosure before the court may
invalidate a property waiver provision in an agreement. 10 1 Thus, the
traditional contract defense of unconscionability alone is not enough
to set aside a premarital agreement under the U.P.A.A. As long as the
parties exchange full financial disclosure before the agreement is
signed, any property right waiver is valid and enforceable, even if un-
conscionable.10 2 The U.P.A.A. permits a court to review conscion-
ability only in cases where the parties did not exchange full and fair
disclosure.
Guided by the model statute, many courts applying common law
have adopted the freedom of contract analysis. This analysis focuses
solely on procedural safeguards and deems the substance of premari-
tal agreements to be outside the scope of judicial review so long as
disclosure is complete. 10 3 Again, the common law result is that un-
conscionable agreements are enforceable so long as financial disclo-
sure is sound.
A survey of the standard to determine the validity and enforceabil-
ity of premarital agreements across the United States reveals the
prevalence of the contract approach to decide the validity of premari-
tal property waivers. Twenty-two states have adopted the standard
language of the U.P.A.A.104 relating to enforcement and require the
party challenging the agreement to prove it is both unconscionable
and that it was executed without adequate financial disclosure.105
Only Rhode Island requires the party challenging the validity and en-
forceability of the agreement to prove the agreement was unconsciona-
ble, signed without the benefit of adequate financial disclosure, and
involuntarily entered into, thus adding two additional hurdles to the
traditional contract defense of unconscionability. 10 6 Additionally, ten
101. See U.P.A.A. §§ 1-13, 9C U.L.A. 39 (2001) (covering a variety of issues including
valid provisions, amending agreements and enforcing agreements).
102. See SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra note 25, at 464-68 (providing examples of the
remaining difficulties presented by the contracts approach).
103. See Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990).
104. See U.P.A.A. § 6, 9C U.L.A. 39 (2001); see also Ronald S. Ladden & Robert J.
Franco, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act: An Ill-Reasoned Retreat from the
Unconscionability Analysis, 4 AM. J. FAm. L. 272 (1990).
105. See U.P.A.A. § 6, 9C U.L.A. 39 (2001); see also infra Appendix A, table II.
106. See infra Appendix A, table I.
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jurisdictions enforce premarital agreements according to common law,
traditional contract principles, except that the defense of unconsciona-
bility is overcome by full financial disclosure.107 Thus, in these thirty-
two states and the District of Columbia, careful clients with compe-
tent counsel may disregard the substantive fairness of the marital
property provision in the agreement.
The remaining states have adopted a variety of contract-based ap-
proaches to decide the enforceability of premarital agreements.10 8 For
example, eight states have adopted a statute that preserves the tradi-
tional contract approach to evaluate the validity of a premarital agree-
ment, including the defense of unconscionability, and some have even
created additional protections for the dependent spouse, such as the
right to consult with independent counsel.10 9 The remaining ten
states employ a common law standard to determine enforceability and
treat premarital agreements as contracts sui generis. The courts in
these jurisdictions require traditional contract safeguards, financial
disclosure, and analyze the substantive fairness or conscionability of
the agreement at the time enforcement is sought.10
C. The Trend to Enforce Premarital Agreements
Contemplating Divorce, as a Matter of Freedom of
Contract, Without Regard to Property Law and
Society's Interests, Creates Inequity
In contrast to the traditional contract approach to premarital
agreement property waivers, the minority approach obligates the
court to analyze not only procedural fairness of agreements, but sub-
stantive fairness as well.ill This alternative requires the court to as-
sess the soundness of the premarital bargain at the time enforcement
107. See infra Appendix A, table III.
108. The uncertainty of the enforceability of these agreements across state lines cre-
ates yet another argument for a uniform rule that the future right to share in
marital property is inalienable until the right matures upon separation or
divorce.
109. See infra Appendix A, table IV. These jurisdictions afford greater protection to
the financially dependent spouse by maintaining the contractual defense of
unconscionability.
110. See infra Appendix A, table V. By adding financial disclosure to the traditional
contract requirements that the agreement be voluntary, fraud-free, duress-free,
conscionable, and, in some cases, fair at the time of enforcement, the courts in
these jurisdictions recognize that premarital agreements are sui generis and re-
quire financial disclosure to insure a knowing waiver by the economically depen-
dent spouse.
111. See infra Appendix A, table V. Under this common law approach, combining pro-
cedural and substantive safeguards, premarital agreements are reviewed for fair-
ness, or at least conscionability, at the time of enforcement. Thus, the court, not
the parties, decides the fairness of the agreement based upon the circumstances
existing at the time enforcement is sought.
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is sought. Only eighteen jurisdictions in the United States permit
courts to set aside an agreement because it is unconscionable or un-
fair."12 In only nine states, Georgia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and
Wisconsin, are courts empowered to review agreements for substan-
tive fairness.1 1 3 In each of these nine states, the substantive fairness
of the property waiver is determined at the time the agreement is en-
forced based upon the circumstances existing at the time enforcement
is sought.
In summary, in forty-one states and the District of Columbia en-
force premarital property waivers without regard to the substantive
fairness of the premarital property waiver as long as full disclosure
was exchanged before the premarital agreement was executed. 114 Of
these forty-one jurisdictions and the District of Columbia, only nine
jurisdictions are empowered to set aside an agreement because it is
unconscionable.11 5 In the remaining thirty-two jurisdictions and the
District of Columbia, the defense of unconscionability may be over-
come by providing adequate financial disclosure, thus entirely shield-
ing the substantive fairness of the agreement from judicial review,
even if the agreement is unconscionable."16
Clearly, over the past thirty years, there has been a shift in soci-
ety's willingness to allow the principle of freedom of contract to over-
come the countervailing principle that the state, as an interested third
party to any marriage, will not enforce premarital agreements be-
cause to do so would violate public policy. 1 17 Premarital property dis-
tribution agreements that previously would have been deemed invalid
and unenforceable as a matter of public policy are now deemed outside
the sphere of court supervision and control. Thus, the freedom of con-
tract ethos has replaced the public policy ban with little controversy or
fanfare. No court or legislation, however, has expressly addressed the
fundamental question underlying all premarital property waivers: can
a party legally waive the right to equitable distribution or community
division of marital property even though marital property cannot be
identified or valued until the time of separation and divorce? The im-
plicit assumption that the future right to share in marital property
may be released prior to divorce is problematic for several reasons.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the traditional contract ap-
proach to the drafting and enforcing of premarital agreements
112. See infra Appendix A, tables IV and V.
113. Id.
114. See infra Appendix A, tables I-V.
115. See infra Appendix A, tables IV and V.
116. See infra Appendix A, tables I, II, and III.
117. See In re Estate of Nelson, 36 Cal. Rptr. 352 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964); Whiting v.
Whiting, 216 P. 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1923).
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presumes without question that marital property rights may be
waived before they mature. A second criticism is that premarital con-
tracts are highly impersonal, while marriage, by definition, is highly
personal. In many cases, the marriage is conditioned upon the execu-
tion of an agreement designed to limit or entirely waive the future
right to share in marital property. 118 The very process of negotiating
a limitation on rights that do not ripen unless and until the parties
divorce eschews the spirit of a perpetual partnership that requires, by
definition, good faith, cooperation, and trust in exchange for a spirit of
enlightened self-interest, thus commercializing marriage.119 Finally,
traditional contract analysis certainly promotes freedom to contract,
but also intensifies the existing economic advantages and disadvan-
tages between the parties and fails to take into account the important
public policy interest underlying the creation of marital property
rights: to achieve economic justice.120
Specifically, a premarital agreement that requires a future spouse
to limit or waive his or her interest in property acquired during the
marriage is problematic without three categories of critical informa-
tion needed to accurately assess the costs and benefits of the waiver:
(1) the identity of marital property that the parties would acquire, but
for the agreement, (2) the value of this property, and (3) the then-ex-
isting circumstances at the time of divorce. In equitable jurisdiction
states, a family court judge is required to consider similar factors in
equitably dividing marital property when the marriage is deemed irre-
trievably broken. These factors include: the personal circumstances of
each party, the separate property owned by each, the earning poten-
tial of each, each party's economic and non-economic contributions to
the acquisition of marital property, a party's role as primary caretaker
of minor children, the likelihood that a party will inherit wealth in the
future, and any other relevant factors based on the existing circum-
stances at the time of separation and divorce. 12 1
118. See DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d 797 (Mass. 2002) (involving a marriage
conditioned upon execution of premarital agreement where future husband's es-
tate was valued between $83 million and $108 million and the prospective spouse
disclosed a net worth of less than $5,000).
119. An extreme example of the commercialization of marriage emerged in the net-
work reality television program, Who Wants to Marry a Multimillionaire? (Fox
television broadcast, 2000). This show highlighted the faltering institution of
marriage and called into question the validity of a marriage between strangers
conditioned upon the availability of an uncontested annulment. See David
Bauder, Is Divorce Court Next Stop?, Associated Press, at http://abcnews.com@
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/millionaire000222.html (Feb. 22,
2000).
120. See SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra note 25, at 464-68.
121. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §307 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 288-89
(1998) (providing two alternative factor groupings to consider).
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These statutory factors demonstrate that marital property distri-
bution decisions are ideally based on current and accurate property
values, taking into consideration the unique circumstances of each
case in equitable distribution states. In community property states,
once the court has identified and valued the property to be distributed,
the property is divided equally between the parties, thus achieving a
rough economic justice.
In contrast, the premarital waiver of the future right to share equi-
tably, or at least equally, in the property acquired during the marriage
is made without any clear understanding of the identity and value of
the marital property that would otherwise be subject to equitable divi-
sion upon divorce. Equally important and consistently overlooked is
the benefit of a series of projections of the fair market value of the
potential marital property interests that the spouse is asked to waive
based on a variety of economic scenarios. 12 2
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of premarital agreements is
that a spouse is required to irrevocably limit or waive the right to
share in marital property without regard to the circumstances at the
time of divorce. Thus, vital information about each party's health, em-
ployment, earnings, earning capacity, and the separate property
owned by each party at the time of divorce is unavailable, as is infor-
mation about the division of uncompensated household duties and
childcare duties, if any. The absence of this material information
presents serious questions regarding the validity and enforceability of
premarital property interest waivers.123
Members of the American Law Institute have also struggled with
the requisite degree of protection to afford to marital property rights.
The ALI is currently developing rules for a comprehensive uniform
law dealing with family law. Chapter 7 deals with the validity and
enforceability of marital agreements. These include agreements exe-
cuted in contemplation of marriage, during marriage, and agreements
between cohabitants.124 The revised uniform law attempts to redress
122. Although speculative, perhaps rough estimates using a variety of criteria to esti-
mate the potential value of the future rights released might provide more rele-
vant information than does disclosure of the value of the assets and liabilities of
the propertied party at the time of the marriage.
123. The inequity is heightened by the conviction of the majority of couples who marry
that their marriage will not end in divorce. See Atwood, supra note 45, at 134
n.31 (citing Lynn Baker & Robert Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Aver-
age: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1992). The policy concerns that arise at divorce do not apply to
premarital agreements waiving rights in the event of death at a time when the
parties are married and living together because the natural impulse is to provide
by will for a spouse; however, similar concerns could arise in situations in which
the parties separate prior to the death of the economically independent spouse.
124. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS, §7.01 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000). Not all jurisdictions apply the same
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the potential inequalities associated with premarital agreements.
With respect to changed circumstances, between the time of execution
of the agreement and enforcement, Section 7.02125 includes the follow-
ing clause limiting the validity and enforceability of a premarital
agreement subject to: "constraints that recognize competing policy
concerns and limitations in the capacity of the parties to appreciate
adequately, at the time of the agreement, the impact of its terms
under different life circumstances."126
Section 7.05 of the proposed uniform law also embodies changes
designed to further secure procedural fairness at the time of execu-
tion. The taint of coercion is addressed by requiring that all agree-
ments be executed at least thirty days before the parties' marriage
and that both parties have the opportunity to consult legal counsel.
To avoid overreaching, the proposed statute setting forth the requi-
sites of an enforceable agreement requires that agreements concluded
without the assistance of separate counsel must state in language
"reasonably understandable," the "nature of any rights . . . arising at
dissolution ... altered by the contract" and stating that the interests
of the spouses with respect to the agreement may be adverse." 127 This
section also places the burden to establish that the agreement was
voluntarily executed on the party seeking to enforce it under section
7.05(2). The proposed contract exit clause, embodied in Section 7.02,
coupled with the procedural fairness requirements contemplated by
Section 7.05,128 reflect the overarching concerns for individual eco-
nomic autonomy and fairness with respect to the division of marital
property upon divorce.
Clearly, drafters of Chapter 7 of the proposed uniform law recog-
nize that the fairness concerns related to changed circumstances can-
not be adequately protected until the parties decide to divorce. Such a
look-back provision necessarily insures that property division will be
negotiated at the time of the divorce and based upon the economic cir-
cumstances existing at the time of divorce, including the identity and
value of marital property. Thus, marital property rights, even if the
subject of a premarital agreement, are not fully alienable until the
standard of validity to premarital agreements and postnuptial agreements. In
Pacelli v. Pacelli, 725 A.2d 56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999), the New Jersey
appellate court applied a stricter level of scrutiny to a mid-nuptial agreement
than the standard required under the New Jersey Premarital Agreement Act be-
cause married individuals enjoy a trusting relationship and owe to each other a
fiduciary duty to act in good faith and to deal fairly with each other.
125. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 7.02 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000).
126. Id.
127. Id. at § 7.05(3)(c)(i)-(ii).
128. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 7.05 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000).
[Vol. 82:460
MARITAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
rights mature at the time of divorce, according to section 7.02 of the
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and
Recommendation.
The look-back provision justifiably limits the individual's freedom
to contract because no property right is absolute, but is held subject to
the best interests of the community. The drafters assert that the spe-
cial state interest in family dissolution distinguishes the enforcement
of premarital agreements from other business contracts. Thus, states
are free to require more assurance that a marital agreement was
knowingly executed and, though valid when executed, may limit or
reject marital agreements as contrary to public policy at the time en-
forcement is sought due to changed circumstances. The drafters also
assert that agreements are more likely to be fair when drafted against
the backdrop of judicial review for fairness at the time of enforcement.
The proposed revisions to the U.P.A.A. currently under considera-
tion by ALI members of the Family Law Committee clearly reflect the
struggle between contract law and property law in relationship to
family economics upon divorce. Thus, the special statutory requisites
of drafting an enforceable agreement, coupled with the second look
privilege afforded to the court, render marital property rights inalien-
able until divorce. As a consequence, the utility of premarital agree-
ments generally under the Chapter 7 revisions is uncertain.
In summary, using a property rights focus to analyze the validity
of premarital agreements leads to several conclusions. 129 First, mari-
tal property embodies the traditional precept that no property right is
absolute.13o Second, the propertied individual's interests, promoted
by the premarital agreement, consistently conflict with the interests
of the dependent spouse. 13 1 Finally, the propertied individual's inter-
est in obtaining a marital property right waiver further conflicts with
the public's interest in promoting the economic liberty upon divorce of
not just one spouse, but of both spouses. Protecting a future spouse's
freedom to contract before marriage may, therefore, prove less urgent
than protecting a future spouse's freedom to contract at the time of
separation and divorce when marital property can be accurately iden-
129. See also, REGAN, supra note 36, at 166-68 (explaining that the rhetoric of property
tends to conceptualize autonomy as focusing on independence as opposed to inter-
dependence and recognition of mutual obligation).
130. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985). In this article, Rose-Ackerman categorizes a variety
of restrictions on ownership and then sets forth her own theory to justify limita-
tions on private ownership.
131. In cases where no conflict exists at the time of marriage, postponing the property
distribution until separation or divorce should logically lead to the same result
envisioned by the parties when they married, so long as there has been no mate-
rial -change in circumstances that would alter either party's expectation or reli-
ance interests.
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tified and valued, furthering the economic liberty interests of both
spouses. 132
Given the competing policy interests of freedom to contract and
placing limits on property ownership, perhaps it is time to examine a
third approach to the validity and enforceability of premarital agree-
ments: an inalienability analysis springing from traditional property
law precepts and divorce reform goals embodied in the no-fault divorce
movement.
V. MARITAL PROPERTY: THE ARGUMENT
FOR INALIENABILITY
Divorce reform legislation created marital property, community
property, and other economic rights arising out of divorce. These stat-
utes enhanced the rights of the economically dependent spouse. As di-
vorce reform legislation swept the country, an industry of premarital
agreements blossomed in response. 13 3 Prior to divorce reform, law-
yers typically recommended premarital agreements only to those with
children from a prior marriage in an effort to protect the estate from
claim by a surviving spouse. 13 4 Following the advent of divorce re-
form, lawyers began to market premarital agreements to individuals
marrying for the first time to protect a family business, a past or fu-
ture inheritance, or the acquired assets of individuals who marry later
in life.135
Uninformed by a property right analysis that marital property
rights should be treated as inalienable until the rights can be identi-
fied, valued, and divided, courts enforced premarital property waivers
based on contract theory. Arguably, the contract approach under-
mines marital property reform in contravention of the stated goal of
132. See FINEMAN, supra note 47, at 33-35. Fineman argues that the shift in family
law to focus on equality was "in fact antirevolutionary - operating to undermine
the fledgling potential for freedom that newly won economic opportunities, cou-
pled with the ability to leave unsatisfactory marriages, presented to women." Id.
at 33. Fineman also stresses that "to impose sameness of treatment, particularly
within the context of family laws, simply perpetuates inequality." Id. at 35.
133. In addition to the premarital agreement drafting boom, a litigation boom has fol-
lowed. See supra note 76 (regarding the increase in premarital agreement litiga-
tion following divorce reform).
134. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 7.01 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000). Historically, United States
courts enforced premarital waivers only in the context of waiving the spousal
survivorship rights of a widow with respect to an elective share claim and other
statutorily created rights. Courts viewed the premarital agreements limiting or
waiving the right to marital property as contrary to sound public policy for a
variety of reasons, including the assumption that such agreements lack adequate
consideration and encourage divorce.
135. See Erica L. Haupt, For Better, For Worse, For Richer, For Poorer: Premarital
Agreement Case Studies, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 29 (2002).
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achieving economic justice between divorcing parties. 136 Because
courts and legislatures adopted the right to contract rubric, without a
careful property counter-analysis, premarital agreements are consist-
ently enforced across the nation without regard to the economic conse-
quences of such enforcement.
If a property law analysis is substituted for into the right to con-
tract analysis, and if we agree that no property right is absolute, but is
always subject to limitation by the countervailing interests of the com-
munity, 13 7 the validity of a premarital waiver of future economic
rights acquired by parties following marriage becomes tenuous. In
fact, strong policy arguments arise to treat such rights as inalienable
until these rights can be identified, valued, and divided at the time of
separation or divorce.
The legal definition of an inalienable right differs dramatically
from context to context. In broad terms, alienability can mean any
restriction on the transferability, ownership, or use of an entitle-
ment. 138 Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "inalienable right"
as: "[a] right that cannot be transferred or surrendered; esp[ecially], a
natural right such as the right to own property."'139 In Market Ina-
lienability, Margaret Jane Radin acknowledges several meanings of
this concept. 140 She addresses the concept of market inalienability as
it applies to the inability of the individual to sell a commodity, such as
blood or babies, legally.141 Other scholars have used the term "ina-
lienability" to refer to future rights that can be waived only at the time
such rights are mature and exercisable. 142 Therefore, if future mari-
tal property rights can only be identified and accurately valued at the
time the marriage is dissolved and if those rights are deemed "inalien-
able," it follows that no individual should be permitted to waive mari-
136. See Reich, supra note 70, at 772 (observing that property, like the Bill of Rights,
'represents a general long range protection of individual and private interests,
created by the majority for the ultimate good of all . . . ."). According to Reich,
property and liberty are inseparable. Id.
137. See Yelpaala, supra note 8, at 161-62.
138. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 130, at 931.
139. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1323 (7th ed. 2001).
140. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1851-
52 (1987).
141. Id.
142. See Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Ina-
lienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 98
(1999). Coleman focuses on the difficulty of accurately assessing the impact of a
release of rights to fertilized embryo if such release is given in advance of the
time of implantation or destruction, that is before the decision to destroy or cre-
ate life is exercised. In fact, he suggests that it "may be impossible to make a
knowing and intelligent decision to relinquish a right in advance of the time it is
to be exercised." Id.
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tal property rights until such rights mature, that is only in the event
of divorce.
The concept of inalienability has been generally explored in rela-
tionship to contract rights. Calabresi and Malamed in their pivotal
article redefining the "cathedral" of property and liability rules, 143
proposed a two-prong analysis to determine whether an entitlement,
defined as any interest protected by the state,144 should be regarded
as inalienable. Subsequently, Kronman proposed that paternalistic
limitations on the right to contract can be divided into three groups:
(1) limitations to further economic efficiency and distributive fairness,
(2) limitations to protect personal integrity and autonomy, and (3) lim-
itations that reflect sound moral judgment.145
A. Inalienability promotes economic efficiency and achieves
distributive justice goals because it reduces the
economic burden of divorce on the public and
advances the interests of the economically
dependent spouse
Whenever the waiver or relinquishment of rights potentially cre-
ates substantial costs to third parties, the transaction may be forbid-
den by the state.146 Calabresi and Malamed use the example of
banning land sale to a polluter as a more cost-effective approach than
legally forcing the polluter to bear the cleanup costs. 14 7 Thomas Hud-
son cites the example of the immutable rule that disallows the limita-
tion of tort liability by contract.148 According to Hudson, efficiency
principles assign the costs associated with negligent conduct to the
individual, rather than to the public.149 Another example of paternal-
istic inalienabilty is the implied warranty of habitability owed by all
landlords to all tenants. This warranty may not be disclaimed be-
cause it seeks to "shift control over housing from one group (landlords)
to another (tenants)" to achieve a minimum level of safety and sanita-
tion in the rental market.150 Thus, the concept of economic efficiency
143. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
144. Id. at 1111-15. First, the authors considered the economic efficiency of inaliena-
bility, including both the costs and benefits to society and the morality concerns
embodied in self-paternalism and true paternalism. Second, the authors consid-
ered the distributive consequences of inalienability in terms of the group that
gains from the inalienability rule and the group that loses. Id.
145. Kronman, supra note 79, at 765.
146. See Calabrasi & Melamed, supra note 143, at 1111.
147. Id.
148. See Thomas L. Hudson, Immutable Contract Rules, The Bargaining Process, and
Inalienable Rights: Why Concerns Over the Bargaining Process Do Not Justify
Substantive Contract Limitations, 34 Amiz. L. REV. 337, 339 (1992).
149. Id. at 344.
150. Kronman, supra note 79, at 772.
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empowers the state to limit the individual's right to contract to pre-
serve shared resources, to prevent foreseeable injury, and to protect
public safety and sanitation.
Distributive justice concerns also arise when courts are called upon
to enforce premarital agreements that deprive the economically de-
pendent spouse of an equitable or at least equal share of the property
acquired during the marriage. Possibly, an unemployed dependent
spouse could be rendered homeless at the time of separation and di-
vorce because the spouse had waived the right to the division of the
property acquired by the parties during the marriage. The situation
could be further exacerbated if the spouse was ill or handicapped. The
consequences might be even more grave if the parties have minor chil-
dren at the time of separation and divorce. Thus, there are clear pub-
lic policy considerations rendering premarital waivers of inchoate
marital property rights invalid and unenforceable. The potential cost
to the state in housing, welfare, medical benefits, and other social ser-
vices bolsters the case for treating marital property as inalienable.
In addition to the specific distributive justice concerns, inalienabil-
ity has a more generalized distributive impact. It will make richer the
class that can precondition marriage upon the waiver of inchoate mar-
ital rightsi51 and it will make poorer those who are required to part
with an equitable share of the property he or she accumulated during
the marriage without regard to title.152 Thus, if the state exercises its
power to protect the interests of the economically vulnerable party at
the time of divorce, it achieves equity in the case at hand and protects
the economically dependent group from harm should the marriage end
in divorce.1 53
B. Inalienability promotes personal integrity by fostering
the economic autonomy of the economically
dependent spouse
Inalienable marital property rights were created by legislatures
not only to attain distributive fairness goals by eliminating a potential
group of financially dependent individuals, but also to protect per-
sonal integrity. One way to protect the personal integrity of both par-
ties to a marriage is to link the valid waiver of marital property rights
to the circumstances existing at the time of waiver. Kronman argues
that the concept of personal autonomy requires the state to safeguard
not only the individual's freedom to contract, but also the individual's
151. See Calabrasi & Melamed, supra note 143, at 1114.
152. See id.
153. See Bailey H. Kuklin, The Justification for Protecting Reasonable Expectations,
29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 863, 877 (2001) (recognizing that distributive justice con-
cerns encompass ideas of both equality and liberty considerations).
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right to (1) make life-altering decisions contemporaneously and (2) to
be free from coercion.15 4
Treating marital property rights as inalienable balances the state's
interest in protecting the right to contract and the right to make life-
altering decisions freely and contemporaneously. First, the inaliena-
bility rule permits marital property waivers only at the time of separa-
tion or divorce, thus uniting in time the waiver of rights and the
existing circumstances. Second, the threat of canceling the wedding
and ending the relationship, absent premarital waiver of the future
right to share in marital property, is eliminated. Clearly, the taint of
coercion is lessened and the goal of fairness is furthered when parties
waive marital property rights based on the circumstances existing at
the time the waiver is implemented at separation and divorce.
An inalienability rule also recognizes the relationship between eco-
nomic opportunity and individual autonomy. Kronman uses the ex-
ample of the prohibition against self-enslavement to demonstrate the
policy goal of protecting personal integrity.15 5 Similarly, Reich
stresses the importance of financial independence to personal lib-
erty.15 6 More recently, Mary Ann Glendon noted that at-will termina-
tion has become less of a threat as the workplace has become more
secure, but "termination at-will continues to disadvantage more than
ever. . . the unpaid labor force, namely homemakers."157
Kronman, Reich, and Glendon each affirm the vital connection be-
tween economic opportunity and individual autonomy. An alienability
rule protects both the individual's right to contract without unneces-
sary state interference and the individual's right to "access to eco-
nomic opportunities and resources that makes non-demeaning, self-
fulfilling life choices a realistic possibility."15s Marital property, cre-
ated by the state, was designed to secure personal autonomy and eco-
nomic independence for both divorced parties. Given the special
relationship between individual autonomy and economic opportunity,
treating marital property as inalienable until mature fosters individ-
ual autonomy while limiting, but not eliminating, the individual's
freedom to contract.
154. See Coleman, supra note 142, at 94; see also Kronman, supra note 79, at 763 n.1.
155. Kronman, supra note 79, at 775.
156. See Reich, supra note 70, at 772-74.
157. See Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property, 53 TUL. L. REV.
697, 701 (1979).
158. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 243 (1993)
(emphasizing that some contract doctrines redistribute resources and promote
autonomy values).
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C. Inalienability reflects sound moral judgment because it
allows life-altering decisions to be made
contemporaneously and protects the financially
dependent party from coercion
Inalienability of inchoate marital property rights reinforces the
status of marriage as a just and fair commitment with economic conse-
quences. In addition to the economic costs associated with the pre-
marital waiver of inchoate marital economic rights, such a waiver may
also create what Calabresi and Malamed refer to as external costs
that are impossible to value and are thus called "moralisms."159 In
some instances, moralisms alone may render a right inalienable.1 60
Prohibiting the sale of slaves, the sale of babies, and the sale of tissue
and organs are examples of inalienability rules. These rules are based
upon the collective judgment that such sales attack personhood.161
Often when moralisms are at the root of the external costs, the trans-
action is outlawed and the right in jeopardy of limitation or waiver is
deemed inalienable.16 2 Therefore, as a matter of moralism and sound
judgment, it may be advisable to postpone the waiver of inchoate mar-
ital property rights until divorce when such rights are more appropri-
ately identified, valued, and divided. Such a limited alienability rule
protects those of inferior wealth, inferior knowledge and understand-
ing of the likely increase in value of such property, inferior knowledge
of the other individual's potential to acquire new property in the fu-
ture, and inferior earning potential, to whom a fiduciary obligation is
arguably owed. 163
D. Many family law rights are consistently treated as
inalienable
Many rights related to family law are already afforded the protec-
tion of inalienability and can be viewed along a continuum. Some
rights can never be waived. One example is the inalienability of the
right to seek a divorce. Designed to protect individual freedom and
personal integrity, this right preserves each individual's independent
right to decide if his or her marriage has become irretrievably bro-
159. Calabrasi & Melamed, supra note 143, at 1111-12.
160. Id. at 1112-14 and accompanying notes 42-48.
161. See Calabresi & Malamed, supra note 143, at 1112-14 and accompanying
footnotes.
162. Id. at 1112. Short of inalienability, Kronman recognizes the utility of"cooling off"
periods to protect individuals from the consequences of rash and ill-considered
decisions. Kronman, supra note 79, at 788.
163. See Alexandria Streich, Spousal Fiduciaries in the Marital Partnership: Marriage
Means Business But the Sharks Do Not Have a Code of Conduct, 34 IDAHo L. REV.
367, 378-79 (1997) (discussing spousal fiduciary duty under Idaho law.)
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ken.164 Another example is a provision contained in some protection
from abuse statutes that requires the district attorney to prosecute
abusers over the abused spouse's objection.16 5 Thus, these statutes
recognize the spousal right to be free from battery as inalienable.
Further along the continuum are rights that can be released, but
only contemporaneously at the time they would otherwise mature.
One example relates to the relinquishment of parental rights in cus-
tody matters. Under most state laws, the release cannot be signed
until after the birth of the child and in many jurisdictions there is an
additional waiting period designed to insure a knowing and intelligent
release of parental rights. 166 In fact, there are at least two different
types of marital property rights that courts do not deem mature until
after divorce: (1) pensions not yet in pay status167 and (2) stock op-
tions that have been granted but cannot yet be exercised due to the
applicable holding period or other conditions. 168
With respect to stock options and pension interests, the law recog-
nizes a marital right to share in an asset that is not yet fully mature.
This lack of maturity carries with it the risks attendant to predicting
164. Kronman, supra note 79, at 775; see also id., at 789 (observing that minors are
prohibited from releasing the defense of minority to avoid an otherwise valid
contract).
165. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domes-
tic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1850-51 (1996).
166. Coleman, supra note 142, at 91-92 (detailing the logic behind the waiting period).
167. See, e.g., Berrington v. Berrington, 598 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), affd, 633
Pa. 589 (Pa. 1993). Marital property portions of employee-spouse's pensions may
be distributed by "immediate offset method" under which the non-employee
spouse receives immediate distribution of marital assets to provide him or her
with equitable share of pension even though pension itself will not actually be
received by the employee spouse until some time in the future, or the "deferred
distribution method," requiring the court to retain jurisdiction and distribute
pension benefits as of benefit determination date. The trial court must weigh the
advantages and disadvantages of each method of distribution according to the
facts of each case in order to determine which method best effects economic jus-
tice between the parties. In cases where the valuation of a marital pension inter-
est is uncertain, deferred distribution of the asset is appropriate. Id.
168. See, e.g., Fisher v. Fisher, 769 A.2d 1165, 1169 (Pa. 2001) In comparing the re-
sults of the immediate offset method and the deferred distribution method, the
court noted,
Unlike the "deferred distribution" method, the second approach has the
commendable quality of finality because it makes a final disposition at
the time of distribution, and need not take account of future fluctuations
in stock prices or other contingencies which may affect the value on the
dates when the stock options may be exercised. On the other hand, the
immediate offset method requires that the value of the asset be known.
We have determined supra that no value for unvested stock options can
be established without unjustifiable assumptions which render the value
impermissibly speculative. This approach, therefore, is not viable in this
case.
Id. The court then ordered the stock options be divided according to the method
of deferred distribution. Id.
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the future value of any asset. 169 Because of the importance of accu-
rate valuation to the overall equitable distribution process, courts
have developed special rules regarding such marital assets. For ex-
ample, many courts retain continuing jurisdiction over marital pen-
sions not yet in pay status.170 Likewise, stock options that have been
granted, but have not reached maturity also present a thorny valua-
tion issue. Under the tag of "delayed distribution," courts can retain
jurisdiction and divide the options in the future after they vest.'17
Delayed distribution is often ordered since the price of the stock as of a
future date determines the value, if any, of the option.' 7 2 As with pen-
sions, courts are wary of arbitrarily assigning value to stock options
that remain unexercised. 173 In many cases, courts retain jurisdiction
to divide marital stock options upon maturity or divide the options in
kind, thus splitting the risk proportionately between the divorcing
parties. 174 Given the state's special interest in promoting marriage,
preserving the family, and discouraging divorce, the inchoate right to
share in marital property should be protected until the property can
be contemporaneously identified, valued, and divided just as divorce
courts retain continuing jurisdiction over immature marital pension
and stock option rights.
In the instances cited above, the degree of alienability of a right is
predicated upon the belief that the waiver decision should be made, if
at all, contemporaneously and should take into account the circum-
stances existing at the time the right is mature. The same defects
that prevent accurate valuation of future pension payments and of im-
mature stock options' 7 5 also compromise a future spouse's ability to
make an informed decision regarding the likely financial impact of a
premarital waiver of future marital property rights.
Thus, uncovering and applying the property theory underlying ex-
isting inalienable family rights demonstrates that traditional contract
protections are insufficient to protect vital marital property rights.
Linking property distribution to the circumstances existing at the
time of divorce insures a more equitable result. 176 Inalienability fos-
ters the economic independence of both parties. Inalienability pro-
169. The court is faced with a problem quite similar to the one encountered by a future
spouse who is required to waive the right to marital property before it can be
identified or valued.
170. See, e.g., Berrington, 598 A.2d at 35-36.
171. See, e.g., Fisher, 769 A.2d at 1169.
172. See David S. Rosettenstein, The ALI Proposals and the Distribution of Stock Op-
tions and Restricted Stock on Divorce: The Risks of Theory Meet the Theory of
Risk, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 243, 245-56 (2002).
173. Id. at 255-56.
174. Id. at 285 n.187 (citing In re Marriage of Moody, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1026-27 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983).
175. See Rosettenstein, supra note 172, at 245-56.
176. See Rosettenstein, supra note 172, at 260.
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motes the underlying moralism that personal liberty requires, while
economic liberty can best be protected by allowing individuals to make
life-altering decisions contemporaneously. Therefore, legislatures and
courts should reexamine the validity and enforceability of the premar-
ital waiver of marital property rights and adopt, instead, a property
law analysis rendering marital property rights inalienable until the
parties divorce, thus rearming the institution of marriage with eco-
nomic consequences.
VI. NEW MARITAL PROPERTY: IN DEFENSE
OF INALIENABILITY
If the inalienability of marital property is entertained, there must
be some consideration of the legal policies eschewed and the legal in-
terests compromised by the shift. The most obvious criticism of ina-
lienability is that it interferes with personal autonomy and the
freedom to contract because it eliminates an individual's right to
knowingly accept risk.
Although the inalienability rule interferes with the freedom of con-
tract rule, premarital agreements, like the contract of marriage itself,
are sui generis contracts. The assumption that the benefit of the bar-
gain is based upon adequate consideration does not withstand scru-
tiny. 177 Thus, the procedural fairness requirements of full disclosure
and even the right to consult independent counsel cannot create the
conditions necessary for a truly knowing waiver. According to Hud-
son, rather than imposing such requirements, courts should adopt "a
contract theory based on individual rights [that] may imply certain
substantive restrictions on the scope of legally permissible agree-
ments."178 Additionally, Radin observed, "[Ilt is not satisfactory to
think that marketing whatever one wishes defines freedom. Nor is it
satisfactory to think that a theoretical license to acquire all objects
one desires defines freedom."179 If we accept that contract theory is
based upon the voluntary and informed consent' 8 0 of the parties and
is reinforced by each party's right to rely upon courts to enforce the
private promise, then only alienable rights are the proper subject of
contract. For example, while an individual may initially agree to a
slave-like relationship, the individual retains the right to revoke the
177. One scholar based his defense of alienability on the presumption that the trans-
action will move the property from a lower to a higher value. Clearly this as-
sumption cannot be tested at the time the agreement is signed, but rather only at
the time of separation or divorce. Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 971-72 (1985).
178. Hudson, supra note 148, at 337-38.
179. Radin, supra note 140, at 1885.
180. Trebilcock, supra note 158, at 244.
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consent at any time and no court has authority to enforce the promise
because it infringes upon an inalienable right.181
A second response to the paternalism critique is that treating mar-
ital property rights as inalienable is no more paternalistic than treat-
ing them as alienable.18 2 Treating marital rights as inalienable
denies the wishes of the present self and allows the future self to exer-
cise the decisionmaking power at a time that is close in proximity to
the time when the rights become ripe.l8 3 Arguably, the right of the
present self to irrevocably waive future inchoate rights should be re-
jected in favor of the future selfs power to make the same decision at
the time the rights ripen with more perfect information. Kronman
wrote, "[a] person who would give away too much of his own liberty
must be protected from himself, no matter how rational his decision or
compelling the circumstances."184
Some might argue that we are treating affianced couples as if they
are temporarily incapacitated 8 5 by their approaching nuptials. Why
treat the couple differently than any other cohabiting couple? The an-
swer flows clearly from the legislated property rights arising out of
marriage designed to ensure a just division of assets if the timeless
contract proves short-lived.
In addition to unwarranted interference with the freedom to con-
tract if property rights are deemed inalienable, some consideration
should be afforded to the impact of alienability on the institution of
marriage. It is possible that some individuals will chose not to marry
absent the protection of a premarital agreement. Some will choose the
option of an early exit from a faltering marriage rather than devote
additional time and emotional energy to reviving the relationship ab-
sent a premarital agreement. At the same time the cost of these po-
tentially lost or abbreviated marriages must be weighed against the
benefit to the individuals and to society at large when marital prop-
erty is identified, valued, and distributed at the time of separation or
divorce. As to those who desire a premarital agreement to protect pre-
marital property from claim, in most jurisdictions, this property is not
considered marital property unless it is commingled with marital
funds or placed in the joint names of the parties. Thus, this concern
can be addressed through sound bookkeeping.
181. Hudson, supra note 148, at 351.
182. See Note, Rumpelstiltskin, supra note 80, at 1945.
183. See id. at 1946.
184. See Kronman, supra note 79, at 775.
185. But see Atwood, supra note 45, at 135 n.34 (citing STEPHEN SUGARMAN & HERMAN
HILL KAY, DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 142 (1990) (arguing that the ro-
manticized ideal of love renders it difficult for engaged couples to engage in
"hard-headed business bargaining").
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It is possible that some children from prior marriages will deem
the law to be punitive as to children from first families. Arguably,
children from prior relationships are protected in the event of divorce
because only property acquired during the marriage is subject to equi-
table distribution.18 6 Thus, default property distribution statutes bal-
ance the competing interests of a subsequent spouse and children
from a prior marriage by defining marital property to exclude property
owned by a party prior to marriage.
Others might suggest that the response of inalienability sweeps too
broadly and that some middle ground might better serve the interests
of the parties and the public. One alternative is to require a substan-
tive fairness review based upon the circumstances existing at the time
enforcement is sought. To the extent a spouse believes the requested
waiver to be fair, it seems only just that the continuing fairness be
tested at the time the waiver is implemented. Theoretically, this
should result in a property distribution award quite similar to the one
envisioned by the default statute.
Another intriguing idea is to limit the term of such contracts to a
more foreseeable period, such as five years, at which time the contract
terminates leaving the parties free to renegotiate should they so de-
sire. Barbara Stark developed a similar proposal in a recent article
and presented a menu of three potential agreements for future
spouses to choose from: (1) gender equality, (2) relationship model,
and (3) custom model.18 7 The agreement decided upon would be sub-
ject to an automatic sunset provision, requiring the parties to renego-
tiate within a specified period. Stark further posits that there should
be some minimum level of fairness built into each agreement. Stark
sidesteps the thorny problems related to a consistent definition of
minimum fairness guidelines and the question of when fairness is rel-
evant, at execution, at dissolution, or both. Stark's proposal at least
limits the term of premarital contracts. It does not, however, permit
the parties to make contractual decisions based upon the circum-
stances existing at the time marital property rights ripen. Thus, her
proposal limits, but does not eliminate, the problem inherent in enter-
ing into agreements determining marital property rights without the
vital details of the identity and value of the marital property and the
circumstances of the parties at dissolution.
In keeping with the policy underlying the elective share statutes in
place to protect the surviving spouse's economic welfare, legislatures
could determine an inalienable right to receive a minimum percentage
186. This is not the case in the event of the death of a spouse who is typically afforded
an elective share or statutory share of the decedent's estate. UNIF. PROBATE
CODE §§ 2-102, 2-102A, 2-202 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 81-83, 102-03 (1998).
187. See Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern
Marriage Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1528-43 (2001).
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of marital property due to a spouse at the time of separation and di-
vorce, affording the spouse an election to proceed under the agreement
or to take the minimum share. This would introduce a prima facie
standard of fairness against which all premarital agreements would
be judged. Of course, this legislative standard could be avoided by an
enforceable choice of law provision and raises forum shopping con-
cerns. This approach is also costly because it would require case by
case review of premarital agreements at the time of divorce and the
minimum percentage is an arbitrary one that is not sensitive to fac-
tual differences. Thus, a minimum percentage rule is less satisfactory
than the inalienable rule.
VII. CONCLUSION
In summary, property law in relationship to marriage and divorce
can be characterized as evolving to achieve economic justice and fair-
ness. For example, in response to the inequity created by treating
married women as wards of their husbands, property law evolved to
recognize the rights of married women to own property. In response
to the inequity of dividing property based upon title at the time of
divorce, legislatures created marital property, property identified by
timing of acquisition, rather than by title, to be divided equitably, or
at least equally upon divorce. Predictably, inequity has again arisen
as individuals seek to escape this newer regime of marital property
and to return to the title regime of property by conditioning marriage
upon signing a premarital agreement. Most jurisdictions employ a
traditional contract analysis to decide the validity of premarital agree-
ments despite the acknowledged purpose of the contract: to skew the
marital ante by limiting or eliminating the economically dependent
spouse's right to create and share in marital property.
A contract analysis of the validity of premarital agreements fails
the individuals, the family, and society. A contract analysis cannot
account for the unavailability of three types of material information:
(1) the identity of the marital property, (2) the value of the marital
property, and (3) the circumstances existing at the time of separation
and divorce. This precise information is, by definition, unavailable to
the parties before they marry. Moreover, this is the precise informa-
tion that a court is mandated to consider in dividing marital property
upon divorce.
In contrast, a property analysis resulting in the conclusion that
marital property rights cannot be waived until mature, in the event of
separation and divorce, furthers a variety of public policy interests.
The inalienability rule reduces the economic burden on the public by
preserving marital property for division between the parties in the
event the marriage fails. The inalienablity rule advantages the eco-
nomically dependent spouses at the expense of the wealthier spouses,
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thus having a distributive justice impact. The inalienability rule pro-
tects the economic autonomy of the individual and permits parties to
make life-altering decisions contemporaneously, with the benefit of all
relevant information. The inalienability rule promotes the interests of
fairness and justice. Finally, the inalienability rule reinvests the deci-
sion to marry with the economic consequences envisioned by state
legislators.
Therefore, in light of the legislative intent supporting the creation
of marital property rights, and the public policy interests promoted by
marital property, spousal rights to marital property should be inalien-
able unless and until the parties' marriage ends in divorce.
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Table I
Jurisdictions that Have Adopted a Form of the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act and Require Involuntariness and Unconscionability
and Inadequate Disclosure to Invalidate a Property Waiver
Effective Standard of Enforceability as to
State Citation Date Property Waiver
1. Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAws 7-1-87 Involuntary and unconscionable
§§ 15-17-1 to at time of execution and inade-
15-7-11 (2000 & quate disclosure. R.I. GEN.
Supp. 2002). LAWS §§ 15-17-6 (2000 & Supp.
2002).
Table II
Jurisdictions that Have Adopted a Form of the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act and Typically Require Unconscionability and
Inadequate Disclosure to Invalidate a Property Waiver
Effective Standard of Enforceability as to
State Citation Date Property Waiver
1. Arizona ARIz. REV. STAT.
§§ 25-201 to 25-
205 (2000 &
Supp. 2002).
2. Arkansas
3. California
4. Colorado
(silent as to
conscionability)
5. Delaware
6. District of
Columbia
ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 9-11-401 to
9-11-413 (2002).
CAL. FAM. CODE
§§ 1600-1617
(West 1994 &
Supp. 2002)
(amended 2001).
CoLo. REV.
STAT. §§ 14-2-
301 to 14-2-310
(1997)
(amended 1996).
DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, §§ 321 to
328 (1999).
D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 46-501 to 46-
510 (2002).
1991 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution and inade-
quate disclosure. ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 25-202 (2000 & Supp.
2002).
1987 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution AND inade-
quate disclosure. ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 9-11-406 (Michie 2002).
1986 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution and inade-
quate disclosure. CAL. FAM.
CODE § 1615 (West 1994 &
Supp. 2002) (amended 2001).
1986 Involuntary at time of execution
or inadequate financial disclo-
sure. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-
307 (1997).
1996 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution and inade-
quate disclosure. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 326 (1999).
1996 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution and inade-
quate disclosure. D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 46-506 (2002).
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Effective Standard of Enforceability as to
State Citation Date Property Waiver
7. Hawaii HAw. REV. STAT. 1987 Involuntary or unconscionable at
8. Idaho
9. Illinois
10. Kansas
11. Maine
12. Montana
13. Nebraska
14. New Mexico
15. North Carolina
16. North Dakota
17. Oregon
§§ 572D-1 to
572D-10 (1993).
IDAHO CODE
§§ 32-921 to 32-
929 (Michie
1996).
750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 10/1-11
(1999).
KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 23-801 to 23-
811 (1995 &
Supp. 2002).
ME. REV. STAT.
tit. 19A, §§ 601
to 11 (West,
1998 & Supp.
2002) (amended
1999).
MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 40-2-
601 to 40-2-610
(2002).
NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 42-1001 to
42-1011 (Reis-
sue 1998).
N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40-3A-1
to 40-3A-10
(Michie 1978 &
Supp. 2001-
2002).
N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 52B-1 to
52B-11 (2001 &
Supp. 2002).
N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 14-
03.1-01 to 14-
03.1-09 (1997 &
Supp. 2001).
OR. REV. STAT.
§ 108.700 to
108.740 (2001 &
Supp. 2002).
time of execution and inade-
quate disclosure. HAw. REV.
STAT. § 572D-6 (1993).
1995 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution and inade-
quate disclosure. IDAHO CODE
§ 32-925 (Michie 1996).
1990 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution and inade-
quate disclosure. 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 10/7 (1999).
1988 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution and inade-
quate disclosure. KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 23-807 (1995 & Supp.
2002).
1987 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution and inade-
quate disclosure. ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 19A, § 608 (West, 1998
& Supp. 2002) (amended 1999).
1987 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution and inade-
quate disclosure. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-2-608 (2002).
1994 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution and inade-
quate disclosure. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 42-1006 (Reissue 1998).
1995 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution and inade-
quate disclosure. N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-3A- 7 (Michie 1978 &
Supp. 2001-2002).
1987 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution and inade-
quate disclosure. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 52B-7 (2001 & Supp.
2002).
1985 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution and inade-
quate disclosure. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-03.1-06 (1997 &
Supp. 2001).
1988 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution and inade-
quate disclosure. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 108.725 (2001 & Supp. 2002).
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Effective Standard of Enforceability as to
State Citation Date Property Waiver
18. South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED
19. Tennessee
(silent as to
conscionability)
20. Texas
21. Utah
(silent as to
conscionabilty)
22. Virginia
LAWS §§ 25-2-16
to 25-2-25
(Michie 1999).
TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-3-501
(2001).
TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 4.001 to
4.010 (Vernon
1998 & Supp.
2003).
UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 30-8-1
to 30-8-9 (1998).
VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-147 to 20-
155 (Michie
2000 & Supp.
2003).
1989 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution and inade-
quate disclosure. S.D. CODIFIED
LAws § 25-2-21 (Michie 1999).
1980 Must be executed freely, knowl-
edgeably, and in good faith, ab-
sent duress or undue influence.
TENN. CODE ANN. §36-3-501
(2001). See also Randolph v.
Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 817
(Tenn. 1996) (holding that pro-
ponent of agreement must estab-
lish full financial disclosure or
independent knowledge).
1997 Involuntary or unconscionable at
the time of execution and inade-
quate disclosure. TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 4.006 (Vernon 1998
& Supp. 2003).
1994 Involuntary or fraudulent and
inadequate disclosure. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-8-6 (1998).
1986 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution and inade-
quate disclosure. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-151 (Michie 2000 & Supp.
2003).
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Table III
Jurisdictions Enforcing Premarital Property Right Waivers
According to Common Law Contract Precepts Without Regard to
Substantive Fairness and Typically Requiring Financial Disclosure
Standard of Enforceability as to Property WaiverState
1. Alabama
2. Alaska
3. Florida
4. Louisiana
(silent as to
financial
disclosure)
5. Maryland
6. Mississippi
7. Ohio
8. Pennsylvania
9. Washington
"Party seeking enforcement of the agreement must show con-
sideration was adequate and that the entire transaction was
fair, just, and equitable from the other person's point-of-of-
view, or agreement was voluntarily reached, with competent
independent advice, and general knowledge of that party's fi-
nancial interests and approximate value." Roberts v. Rob-
erts, 802 So. 2d 230, 233 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (citing Barn-
hill v. Barnhill, 386 So. 2d 749, 733 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980)).
Court approves the U.P.A.A. standard of involuntary or un-
conscionable at time of execution and inadequate disclosure.
Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1049 (Alaska 1987).
Adequate provision or inadequate financial disclosure evi-
dencing fraud. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
Matrimonial agreements establishing a regime of separate
property or modifying or terminating the legal regime are
valid and enforceable subject to the same grounds for rescis-
sion as other contracts: capacity, consent, error, fraud, and
duress. McAlpine v. McAlpine, 679 So. 2d 85, 93 (La. 1996).
Nonmoving party must have actual knowledge or adequate
disclosure of rights waived; including both the value of real
and personal property. Absent such disclosure and absent a
fair and proportionate allowance, fraud will be presumed.
The party seeking to enforce the agreement must prove it
was voluntarily entered with full knowledge of its meaning
and effect. Harbom v. Harbom, 760 A.2d 272 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2000).
Agreement must be executed with the benefit of financial dis-
closure and is subject to the same rules of construction and
interpretation that apply to contracts generally. Smith v.
Smith, 656 So. 2d 1143, 1147 (Miss. 1995).
Agreements are valid and enforceable (1) if they have been
entered into freely without fraud, duress, coercion, or over-
reaching; (2) if there was full disclosure, or full knowledge
and understanding of the prospective spouse's property; and
(3) if the terms do not promote divorce. Gross v. Gross, 464
N.E.2d 500, 506 (1984).
Premarital agreements executed with the benefit of full fi-
nancial disclosure will be enforced absent fraud, duress, or
any other traditional defense to the enforceability of an
agreement. Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165-67
(1990).
"Fair and reasonable provision for party not seeking enforce-
ment or full and fair disclosure, absent any traditional con-
tract defenses and with the benefit of independent counsel
when necessary." In re Marriage of Matson, 730 P.2d 668,
670 (Wash. 1986).
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Standard of Enforceability as to Property Waiver
"General contract principles are applicable to premarital
agreements. Absence of detailed financial disclosure will not
void the agreement, but a fair disclosure of the nature and
amount of assets renounced is necessary." Laird v. Laird,
597 P.2d 463, 468 (Wyo. 1979) (citing In re Ward's Estate,
285 P.2d 1081-84 (Kan. 1995)).
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Table IV
Jurisdictions Enforcing Premarital Property Right Waivers Based
Upon a Statutory Scheme Permitting Courts to Determine
Conscionability/Fairness
Effective Standard of Enforceability as to
State Citation Date Property Waiver
1. Connecticut CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 46b-
36a to 46b-36j
(Supp. 2003).
2. Indiana
3. Iowa
4. Minnesota
(substantive
fairness state)
5. Nevada
6. New Jersey
IND. CODE
§§ 31-11-3 to
31-11-10 (1997).
IOWA CODE
§§ 596.1 to
596.12 (2001).
MINN. STAT.
§ 519.11 (1990
& Supp. 2003).
NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 123A.010 to
123A.100
(2001).
N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 37:2-31 to
37:2-41 (West
2002).
1995 Involuntary or unconscionable
as a matter of law, at execution
or enforcement, or inadequate fi-
nancial disclosure, or inade-
quate opportunity to consult in-
dependent counsel. CONN. GEN.
STAT. 46b-36g (Supp. 2003).
1997 Involuntary or unconscionable at
execution. IND. CODE § 31-11-8
(1997).
1992 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution or unfair and
unreasonable disclosure. IowA
CODE § 596.8 (2001).
1979 Premarital agreements shall be
valid and enforceable if (a) there
is a full and fair disclosure of
the earnings and property of
each party and (b) the parties
have had an opportunity to con-
sult with legal counsel of their
own choice. MINN. STAT.
§ 519.11 (1990 & Supp. 2003);
Petty v. Reese, No. C8-98-1576,
1999 WL 261952 (Minn. App.
Ct. 1999) (holding that the court
has a limited power to review
substantive fairness at time the
agreement is enforced).
1989 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time of execution or inadequate
disclosure. NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 123A.080 (2001).
1988 Involuntary or unconscionable at
time enforcement sought or in-
adequate disclosure or lack of
opportunity to consult with inde-
pendent counsel. Proof by clear
and convincing standard. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 37:2-38 (West
2002).
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State
7. South Carolina
(substantive
fairness state)
8. Wisconsin
(substantive
fairness state)
Citation
S.C. CODE ANN
§ 20-7-473 (La'
Co-op. Supp.
2002).
WIS. STAT.
§ 767.255(L)
(2001).
Effective Standard of Enforceability as to
Date Property Waiver
r. 1986 Antenuptial contracts are pre-
w sumptively fair and equitable so
long as (1) voluntarily executed,
(2) both parties separately rep-
resented by counsel, and (3) the
parties exchanged full financial
disclosure. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
7-473 (4) (Law Co-op. Supp.
2002). See also Hardee v.
Hardee, 558 S.E.2d 264, 268-69
(S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (using three
part test: (1) was the agreement
obtained by fraud, duress, mis-
take, misrepresentation, or non-
disclosure of present facts; (2)
agreement is conscionable; (3)
have the facts and circum-
stances changed so as to make
enforcement unfair or unreason-
able).
1985 Court can refuse to divide prop-
erty if hardship is created on
the non-moving party or the
children of the marriage. The
court can also alter distribution
based on a number of factors.
Gardner v. Gardener, No. 97-
1797, 1998 WL 391735 (Wis.
App. 1998) (unpublished opin-
ion).
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Table V
Jurisdictions Enforcing Premarital Property Right Waivers Based
Upon Common Law Principles of Conscionability and/or Fairness
State Standard of Enforceability as to Property Waiver
1. Georgia Three criteria used to determine enforceability: (1) was the
(substantive agreement obtained through fraud, duress, mistake, misrepre-
fairness state) sentation, or nondisclosure of facts; (2) is the agreement un-
conscionable; and (3) have the facts and circumstances
changed since the agreement was executed, so as to make its
enforcement unfair and unreasonable. Allen v. Allen, 400
S.E.2d 15, 16 (Ga. 1991) (citing Scherer v. Scherer, 292 S.E.2d
662, 666 (Ga. 1982)).
2. Kentucky Three criteria used to determine enforceability: (1) was the
(substantive agreement obtained through fraud, duress, mistake, misrepre-
fairness state) sentation, or nondisclosure of facts; (2) is the agreement un-
conscionable; and (3) have the facts and circumstances
changed since the agreement was executed, so as to make its
enforcement unfair and unreasonable. Blue v. Blue, 60
S.W.3d 585, 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Gentry v. Gentry,
798 S.W.2d 928, 936 (Ky 1990)).
3. Massachusetts Agreement must be executed with fair disclosure, voluntarily,
(substantive and must be fair and reasonable at the time enforcement is
fairness state) sought, with "fair and reasonable requiring a lesser showing
of inappropriateness than unconscionability." Upham v.
Upham, 630 N.E.2d 307, 310-11 (Mass. App. Ct.1994) (citing
Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (Mass. 1981)).
4. Michigan Three criteria used to determine enforceability: (1) was the
(substantive agreement obtained through fraud, duress, mistake, misrepre-
fairness state) sentation, or nondisclosure of facts; (2) is the agreement un-
conscionable; and (3) have the facts and circumstances
changed since the agreement was executed, so as to make its
enforcement unfair and unreasonable. Booth v. Booth, 486
N.W.2d 116, 118 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
5. Missouri Agreement must be voluntary, executed with benefit of full
disclosure, and must be conscionable at the time enforcement
is sought. King v. King, 66 S.W.3d 28, 36 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(citing Miles v. Werle, 977 S.W.2d 297, 301 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998)).
6. New Hampshire Premarital property waivers are governed by the same rules
(substantive of construction as apply to other contracts. MacFarlane v.
fairness state) Rich, 567 A.2d 585, 588 (N.H. 1989) (citing Griswold v. Heat
Corporation, 229 A.2d 183, 186 (N.H. 1967)). Additionally,
the court imposed three standards of fairness: (1) the agree-
ment was not obtained through fraud, duress, or mistake or
through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a material fact;
(2) the agreement is not unconscionable; and (3) the facts and
circumstances have not changed to render the agreement un-
enforceable. Id. at 589.
7. New York Antenuptial property distributions will only be set aside if un-
conscionable. Conscionability is determined at the time en-
forcement is sought. Pennise v. Pennise, 466 N.Y. Supp. 2d
631, 634 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
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State Standard of Enforceability as to Property Waiver
8. Oklahoma Agreements will be enforced if they are freely entered absent
(substantive fraud, duress, or coercion and executed with the benefit of
fairness state) full, fair, and frank disclosure. Taylor v. Taylor, 832 P.2d
429, 430-31 (Ok. Ct. App. 1991) (citing In re Estate of Bur-
gess, 646 P.2d 623, 626 (Ok. Ct. App. 1982)). Additionally,
the agreement must be just and equitable in light of the cir-
cumstances existing at the time that enforcement is sought.
Manhart v. Manhart, 725 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Okla. 1986).
9. Vermont Premarital agreements must be executed freely, voluntarily,
and with fair disclosure of each party's financial status. The
substantive provisions must be conscionable at the time en-
forcement is sought and may not render the spouse a public
charge or provide a standard of living far below that enjoyed
during marriage. Bassler v. Bassler, 593 A.2d 82, 87 (Vt.
1991).
10. West Virginia Premarital agreements must be executed willingly and know-
ingly under circumstances free of fraud, duress, or misrepre-
sentation. Agreements must be conscionable at the time en-
forcement is sought and courts may consider changed circum-
stances. Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 115-16 (W. Va. 1985).
